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Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential
Creativity in Intellectual Property
STEFAN BECHTOLD, CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN*
All creativity and innovation build on existing ideas. Authors and inventors copy,
adapt, improve, interpret, and refine the ideas that have come before them. The
central task of intellectual property (IP) law is regulating this sequential innovation
to ensure that initial creators and subsequent creators receive the appropriate sets
of incentives. Although many scholars have applied the tools of economic analysis
to consider whether IP law is successful in encouraging cumulative innovation, that
work has rested on a set of untested assumptions about creators’ behavior. This
Article reports four novel creativity experiments that begin to test those assumptions.
In particular, we study how creators decide whether to copy, or “borrow,” from
existing ideas or to innovate around them.
Our data suggest that creators do not consistently behave the way that economic
analysis assumes. Instead of rationally weighing the objective costs and benefits of
different courses of action, creators instead were influenced by decision-making
heuristics and individual preferences that often led to suboptimal and inefficient
creative behavior. Many of our subjects chose to borrow when innovating was the
optimal strategy, and even more chose to innovate when borrowing was the optimal
strategy. We find that subjects are only mildly responsive to external incentives.
Rather, choices between innovation and borrowing correlated much more powerfully
with their internal, subjective beliefs about the difficulty of innovating. We conclude
by exploring the implications of our data for innovation markets and IP doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Human life is full of change. And yet there is one commonplace that is as true
now as it was in Biblical times: “there is nothing new under the sun.”1 However
original a new idea may seem, inevitably it is derived from previously existing ones.2
All new authors and inventors stand on the shoulders of those who came before them.
Their ability to do so, however, is affected by the existence of intellectual property
(IP) rights protecting existing ideas.
When an idea is protected by a copyright or patent, others who want to copy it, in
whole or in substantial part, and use it for further development, evolution, and
refinement must license the rights from their owner. Licensing is costly, and
subsequent creators have to make decisions about whether to license existing IP
rights or whether to create something that does not impinge upon those rights—an
endeavor that may itself be costly when existing IP forecloses certain creative
opportunities. In this way, IP law not only affects the pace of sequential innovation,
but also its direction. At least at the level of theory, IP law affects innovators’
decisions regarding whether to build upon existing IP rights, or whether to work
around those rights.
This aspect of IP law3 is a vital component of the law’s aim: to optimize creative
production by balancing incentives to current creators with access to their ideas for

1. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
2. Throughout this Article we use the term “ideas” to refer to the products of creative
endeavor. This includes copyrightable works of authorship and patentable inventions.
3. In this Article we focus exclusively on copyright and patent law to the exclusion of
trademark and trade-secret law. Also, we focus on U.S. IP law and do not consider diverging
allocations of IP rights on sequential innovation in foreign IP regimes.
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subsequent downstream creators. If the rights given to initial creators are too weak,
incentives to create new ideas will likewise be insufficient. But if the rights given to
initial creators are too strong, later development will be hindered in excess of what
is required to sufficiently optimize first-stage creativity.
A wealth of scholarly literature has employed the tools of law and economics
to explore sequential innovation and the proper balance between the interests of
initial and follow-on creators.4 This work has generally assumed that creators,
whether first comers or followers, are rational people who act to maximize their
individual welfare. As yet, however, almost no research focuses on how creators
actually make decisions associated with sequential innovation.5 This Article
describes a series of experiments doing just that. It addresses the extent to which
innovation heuristics—mental shortcuts about innovation decisions—affect
creators’ behavior.
In particular, the experiments reported in this Article explore how creators decide
whether to copy, or “borrow” from, existing ideas or to innovate around them. IP
rights associated with existing ideas never cover the entire relevant creative field.
There are always opportunities for others to work around existing rights in
noninfringing ways. Which strategy is optimal—borrowing or innovating—depends
on a number of factors including the costs of licensing the rights and the ease of
working around those rights.
We are interested in how creators actually make these decisions. Are they
successful, rational judges of the costs and benefits of different options? Or are they
prone to systematic biases that distort their decisions? The results of our experiments
suggest that the latter is more likely the case. In particular, we find that people’s
innovation decisions are not strongly influenced by objective assessment of the costs
and benefits of their choices. Instead, creators’ internal beliefs and preferences about
innovation contexts matter much more. Our data suggest the existence of innovation
heuristics in which creators use mental shortcuts to make decisions about creativity.
Often, but not always, these heuristics lead creators to make poor choices. Many
creators choose to innovate even though they would be much better off borrowing,
and many other creators choose to borrow when doing so is clearly suboptimal.
Understanding how people choose whether to innovate or to borrow from others’
creativity is important; this is one of the principal decisions that IP law is intended
to influence. Existing IP laws shape sequential innovation based on a broad
expectation that creators will act, on balance and over time, rationally. To the extent
that creators deviate from these expectations, IP law will be inefficient, and it will
fail to meet whatever innovation goals we have set for it. Our experiments help
deepen the law’s understanding of how creators select between innovation and

4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See, e.g., Kevin J. Bourdreau & Karim Lakhani, “Open” Disclosure of Innovations,
Incentives and Follow-On Reuse: Theory on Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field
Experiment in Computational Biology, 44 RES. POL’Y 4 (2015); Julia Brüggemann, Paolo
Crosetto, Lukas Meub & Kilian Bizer, Intellectual Property Rights Hinder Sequential
Innovation: Experimental Evidence (Ctr. for European Governance and Econ. Dev. Research,
Discussion Paper No. 227, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545950
[https://perma.cc/78MC-KUGH].
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borrowing in the process of sequential innovation. That guidance could help the law
better distribute resources and encourage innovation.
Part I of this Article discusses the economic theory of sequential innovation, and
its regulation by IP rules. The findings of four novel experiments are described in
Part II. Then, Part III explores the implications of these findings for IP law and
policy.
I. REGULATING SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION
From an economic perspective, the regulation of sequential innovation is the
central feature of intellectual property systems. When an author or inventor creates
something new, that act often opens up multiple avenues for further creative
development. Books can be made into movies. Pharmaceuticals can be refined for
greater efficacy or reduced side effects. This kind of evolution, development,
refinement, and interpretation lies at the heart of creativity and innovation—very few
creative works of any importance spring into being fully formed in the first act that
leads to their creation.
IP law regulates sequential innovation in a number of ways. Copyright and patent
laws affect who is permitted to engage in sequential innovation, how they are
permitted to do so, and the speed with which sequential innovation takes place. In so
doing, these laws attempt to optimize creative production by balancing incentives to
initial creators with access to subsequent creators. How well our IP laws strike this
balance, though, depends on whether creators respond to incentives in the ways that
the law assumes they do.
A. Incentives and Access in Intellectual Property Law
In a world without IP rights, sequential innovation would be straightforward: if
an inventor had an idea for a way to improve a smartphone, she would simply create
the new version and sell it. Or if a filmmaker thought that a book would make a good
movie, he could just adapt the book into a screenplay, and then hire a cast and crew
and shoot the movie. IP law, however, sets up barriers to the reuse of pre-existing
works by granting to initial creators certain rights in the “downstream” uses of their
creations. The law establishes these rights to make sure that the initial creators bother
to make their works in the first place.6
According to the standard account of IP rights, creators require incentives to
produce and disseminate their creations.7 The standard account views inventions and
expressive works as costly to produce but relatively cheap to copy and disseminate.8
In the absence of IP rights, others could simply copy new works and inventions and
sell them at the marginal cost of reproduction.9 Because the marginal cost of

6. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997).
7. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 20–21 (2003).
8. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004).
9. See id.
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reproduction does not include the initial creator’s costs of research and development,
she would never make any money selling works at marginal cost and would never
bother to create in the first place.10 By prohibiting others from copying the creation,
IP allows the creator a chance to recoup her investment by selling the work for above
the marginal cost of reproduction.11
But copyright and patent laws do more than prevent others from identically
copying protected creations; they also prevent others from producing some similar
or new versions of the protected creations. So in the example above, the author of a
novel receives a copyright that covers exact duplication of the novel as well as
“substantially similar” variations and other “derivative works,”12 including
translations, sequels, and movie versions of the novel. By producing these other
versions or by licensing the rights to others, the novelist can make more money, and,
thus, she receives a greater incentive to invest in creating the novel in the first place.13
While some amount of IP protection is deemed essential for creative incentives,
too much protection can harm creativity. IP rights create a number of significant
social costs, both static and dynamic.14 First, because owners can charge prices above
the marginal cost of reproduction, some consumers who would have purchased the
goods that embody the inventions and expressions at the competitive price will not
be able to purchase at the supracompetitive price that will be charged when a
copyright or patent creates market power.15 Economists refer to this as deadweight
loss.16 Second, and more importantly for this Article, IP rights raise the cost of
sequential innovation and risk creating dynamic inefficiencies.17 Because copyrights
and patents grant some level of control to initial creators over downstream uses of
their creations, subsequent creators will have to negotiate with them in order to
produce and market their new creations.18 If Betty wants to make and sell her
improved version of Alice’s patented invention, Betty and Alice will have to spend
time and money negotiating a licensing fee. Depending on how costly these

10. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 281 (2014).
11. See id.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
13. According to Suzanne Scotchmer, initial creators need to be able to capture some of
the value of sequential innovations because much of the value of the initial innovation may
come from positive externalities associated with downstream products. That is, the social
benefit conferred by the idea may be that it makes the creation of other ideas cheaper. If the
initial creator cannot capture some of this surplus, she may have insufficient incentives to
invest in creating the idea in the first place. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991).
14. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 996 (“Granting authors and inventors the right to exclude
others from using their ideas necessarily limits the diffusion of those ideas, and so prevents
people from benefiting from them.”).
15. Id.
16. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 497–98 (1996).
17. Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First
Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 402 (2012).
18. Lemley, supra note 6, at 998.
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negotiations are, they will, at best, increase the price of the improved goods.19 At
worst, they will swamp the benefits that Betty could have realized from the
improvement so that she cannot afford to make her improvement at all.20
Copyright and patent laws must strike a balance between the incentives given to
initial creators and the opportunities for sequential innovation reserved for
downstream creators. If the former are too low, the orthodox model holds that
nothing gets produced in the first place, but if they are too high, there will be
insufficient development and evolution. The next section discusses the various
doctrines that IP law uses to strike this balance.
B. Regulating Sequential Innovation
Legal doctrines about the length and breadth of copyrights and patents as well as
laws about derivative works, the doctrine of equivalents, and fair use all regulate the
process of innovation. The goal of these and other doctrines—and of IP systems as a
whole—is to strike a balance between the incentives provided to initial creators and
the opportunities left over for subsequent creators. In this sense, regulating sequential
innovation is the principal problem of IP law.
For a simple example of how this balancing works, consider the length of time
that an IP right lasts. The longer the right lasts, the more money the initial inventor
can hope to make from the invention and, thus, the greater the incentive to invest in
the investment in the first place.21 From that point of view, it would seem like IP
rights should last forever.22 But from the perspective of long term growth and
innovation, longer IP rights might create problems. The existence of the IP right
increases the costs to competitors who want to make their own newer and better

19. Id. (“[T]he existence of preexisting intellectual property rights imposes a positive cost
on improvers that they would not otherwise face.”).
20. Scotchmer, supra note 13, at 32 (“If the second innovator does not get all the surplus
being bargained over, he will earn only a fraction of the new product's market value and
presumably only a fraction of its social value, and this fraction may be less than the cost of
developing it. Hence the incentive for an outside firm to develop second generation products
can be too weak.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1996) (“At some point, giving authors additional copyright
protection will reduce the supply of new works because the number of marginal authors
deterred from creating by the high cost of source material will exceed the number encouraged
to create by the increased value of a work associated with a marginal increase in copyright
protection.”).
21. Of course, discounting for the present utility, the value of a dollar made on a work a
century from now is not likely to provide much additional incentive for a creator today. See
Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright:
The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435, 439 (2005);
see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569, 1571 (2009).
22. The musician Sonny Bono thought so. See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Beat Should Not
Go On: Resisting Early Calls for Further Extensions of Copyright Duration, 112 PENN ST. L.
REV. 783, 791 n.63 (2008) (“Sonny Bono had initially favored making copyright duration
perpetual before learning that a move by Congress to grant perpetual copyright protection
would run afoul of the ‘limited times’ language in the Copyright Clause.”).

2016]

INNOVATION HEURISTICS

1257

versions of the product. So the longer the right, the harder it is for newcomers to
compete and innovate. IP law must set the duration of rights at a length that provides
sufficient encouragement for initial creators without unduly burdening follow-on
creators.23
Copyright law and patent law differ greatly in the ways that they approach
problems of sequential innovation, and these differences affect how easy it is for
others to reuse existing ideas. In some ways, copyright law is more protective of
sequential innovations than is patent law. For example, copyright law does not
impose liability on defendants who have independently created the same work
without copying the plaintiff’s work, while patent law imposes liability on all
defendants who violate a right whether they copied from the plaintiff’s invention or
not.24 Accordingly, if a new creator happens to hit independently upon a great idea
that is covered by an existing copyright, the new creator is free to use it.25 Copyright
law is also limited by its central doctrine distinguishing between original creative
expression, which can be copyrighted, and unprotectable ideas.26 This means that
some kinds of creativity are simply ineligible for copyright protection because they
are so essential to later creators.27 Finally, copyright does allow some “fair uses” to
be made of copyrighted works, which preserves some (uncertain and
context-specific) innovation space for follow-on creativity.28 No similar limitations
to the rights of the original inventor exist in patent law.29
In other ways, however, copyright law grants a smaller share of the value from
potential sequential innovation to the downstream creator than does patent law.
First, patent law provides relatively short terms (twenty years from the filing

23. However, William Landes and Richard Posner have argued for copyright protection
that could be renewed indefinitely, in order to address congestion externalities and address
incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting copyrighted works. William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).
24. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,
525–33 (2004).
25. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d. Cir. 1936) (“[I]f
by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian
Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keats’s.”).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
27. Patent employs its own limitations designed to screen out essential building blocks of
invention, such as the proscription against patenting laws of nature and products of nature. See
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (ruling on the
patentability of laws of nature); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (ruling on the patentability of products of nature).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The existence of the fair-use doctrine considerably broadens
the scope for some kinds of follow-on creativity, especially when the creativity engages in
criticism, parody, or transformation of the existing work.
29. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (advocating for fair-use-like rights for reverse
engineering in patent law).
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date),30 while copyright law provides incredibly long terms (often for the life of
the author plus an additional seventy years).31 This means that sequential
innovators will be able to build on patented inventions much more rapidly than on
copyrighted works.
More importantly, though, the scope of the rights with respect to sequential
innovation differ between copyright and patent law. An author of a copyrighted work
obtains the exclusive right not just to make and distribute literal copies of the work
but also to create a wide range of other similar works. Thus, nonliteral but still
“substantially similar” copies violate the owner’s rights.32 Even more broadly, the
copyright owner obtains the exclusive rights to all actual or potential “derivative
works” that arise from the copyrighted work, including all sequels, translations,
recreations, and most other changes.33 If someone writes a sequel to the Rocky
movies, for example, the writer cannot obtain any rights in her sequel and is subject
to a copyright lawsuit from Sylvester Stallone.34 Accordingly, the would-be improver
is effectively prevented from engaging in creating a new work until she has obtained
the original copyright owner’s permission.
By contrast, when it comes to the scope of rights and the ownership of follow-on
innovation, patent law is much more responsive to downstream creators. First, patent
law’s counterpart to the derivative-works right, known as the doctrine of equivalents,
protects a narrower range of nonidentical creations. Just as the scope of a copyright
includes all works that are “substantially similar” to it, the scope of a patent extends
to other inventions that are “insubstantially different” from it.35 Despite the linguistic
similarity of these standards,36 patent’s doctrine of equivalents gives patent owners
a much narrower degree of control over variations on their work relative to
copyright’s rules regarding derivative works. Indeed, in recent years patent law’s
doctrine of equivalents has been narrowed substantially.37 Moreover, when the

30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). This is the case for standard human authors. In the case of
an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures
for a term of ninety-five years from the year of its first publication or a term of 120 years from
the year of its creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012).
32. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that
copyright law may not allow “plagiarist[s] [to] escape by immaterial variations”). The
substantial similarity doctrine can extend protection to the work’s plot, structure, characters,
and “total concept and feel.” Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1016.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
34. See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
25, 1989) (dismissing the lawsuit of an author who wrote an authorized script for a new Rocky
movie filed against Stallone for using aspects of the script in his own sequel).
35. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521–22 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
36. See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 703–06 (1989)
(discussing the differences between copyright’s substantial similarity doctrine and patent’s
doctrine of equivalents).
37. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007) (demonstrating that the introduction of
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downstream innovator’s invention marks a sufficiently great improvement over the
original patent, although still technically infringing it, the “reverse doctrine of
equivalents” kicks in to vitiate liability.38
Most importantly, patent law allows follow-on creators to obtain IP rights in new
improvements that use and borrow from, and thus infringe, protected inventions.39
For example, if an inventor thinks of a way to improve the fuel economy of an
existing, patent-protected engine, the inventor can obtain a separate patent on the
improvement. The improver cannot make the improvement without infringing or
licensing the original patent. And while the original inventor can keep making the
original engine, he cannot incorporate the improvement without licensing it from the
second inventor. The existence of these “blocking patents” means that both the initial
inventor and the follow-on inventor must negotiate to produce the improved
product.40 This system of blocking patents gives both parties incentive to
successfully complete negotiations if there is money to be made from the improved
product.
For these reasons, and especially the last one, patent law is generally (but not
inevitably) more supportive of follow-on innovators than copyright law is.41
Would-be secondary inventors tend to face fewer challenges to sequential innovation
than do would-be secondary authors. Why are the rules for improvements different
in patent versus copyright? And do these doctrines efficiently balance rights between
the two groups of creators?

Markman claim construction hearings was associated with a substantial decline in the
application of doctrine of equivalents).
38. According to the Supreme Court:
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the
latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent,
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little
subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a
statute has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit
and intent.
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
39. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1008–09.
40. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 860 (1990) (“Two patents are said to block each other when
one patentee has a broad patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on some
improved feature of that invention.”).
41. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1029. He writes:
Comparing the treatment of improvers under patent and copyright law
leads to a rather surprising result: copyright law is significantly more hostile
to improvements than is patent law. What is surprising is not so much that the
rules differ, but the way in which they differ. Copyright is traditionally
thought to afford weaker, not stronger, protection than patent law, in part to
compensate for the fact that copyrights are so much easier to obtain than
patents and last so much longer. But in the context of improvements, the
opposite result obtains.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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C. The Economics of Sequential Innovation
The economic rationales for these doctrines have been richly studied. These
rationales include the benefits of having a single party direct investment in a
resource, the likelihood that the initial creator or a secondary creator will produce
valuable improvements, and the possibility of reducing duplicative and wasteful
research. Numerous authors have assessed the different incentive effects of the patent
and copyright systems’ approaches to sequential innovation, often coming to
different conclusions.42
Edmund Kitch first addressed the economics of sequential innovation in 1977.43
Kitch analogized inventions (his sole focus) to a mineral claim,44 and, accordingly,
he emphasized the public-goods nature of technological information. In the
absence of patent rights, the knowledge embodied in an invention could be easily
shared with others without the inventor’s consent. In Kitch’s view, this would lead,
inevitably, to an inefficient use of the invention in the same way that commonly
owned property, like a mine, pasture, or lake, would be inefficiently used. Acting
selfishly, others would try to use the invention quickly and for personal profit
without thought to its long-term value and sustainability.45 IP rights solve this
tragedy of the commons, according to Kitch, by naming a manager of the invention
and protecting his ability to efficiently use the invention.46 Now, instead of
allowing wasteful competing uses of an invention (such as when two competing
firms attempt to develop improvements of the invention), the owner of the patent
can direct and coordinate investments in sequential innovation in ways that will
maximize the invention’s value.47
As Mark Lemley points out,48 although Kitch’s analysis focused on patents, its
structure is most similar to current copyright doctrine.49 Consider its application to
the author of a children’s story. In the absence of copyright protection for derivative
works, once the story is published and deemed successful, others will quickly race
to capitalize on its value. Various authors might begin publishing sequels of the story,

42. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 108–15, 316–20; Lemley, supra note 6, at
1029–42; Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 843–44; Scotchmer, supra note 13, at 30–32;
Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 702–06 (2014); see
also Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work
Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013).
43. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
44. Id. at 266.
45. Id. at 273–74.
46. Id. at 276 (“No one is likely to make significant investments searching for ways to
increase the commercial value of a patent unless he has made previous arrangements with the
owner of the patent. This puts the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for
technological and market enhancement of the patent's value so that duplicative investments
are not made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.”).
47. Id. (“[T]he patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the value
of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable
information appropriable by competitors.”).
48. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1014.
49. See supra note 32.
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while other companies compete to get a movie version into theaters the quickest. Still
others may make toys and clothing using the story’s characters. All of this investment
in design, development, and marketing is potentially wasteful. The world may not
need any movie versions of the story, never mind three of them. Moreover, a rational
movie studio, knowing the kind of competition it will likely face from others, may
simply abandon the project altogether. According to Kitch, by giving a single entity
ownership over the whole field of derivative works, IP law prevents both the
wastefulness and the lack of incentives. Coordinated investment in ideas is better
than rivalrous investment.50
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson were among the first to critique Kitch’s
theory of sequential innovation.51 Where Kitch saw competitive investment in
potential improvements as wasteful, Merges and Nelson viewed it as a spur to
creativity. They worried that granting a large IP prospect right to a creator might
lead to inactivity and underinvestment as the original creator rested on its laurels.52
In addition, Merges and Nelson were skeptical that a single owner of a broad right
would efficiently manage the various and unpredictable improvements that the idea
might spawn.53 Although the firm that invents a technology had one good idea,
there is little reason to think that it will have the second, third, or fourth good idea.
Merges and Nelson thus favor a distributed approach to innovation that allows for
many minds to tackle the possibilities created by a new idea.54 While Kitch’s
prospecting inventor could certainly license all of these opportunities to others, in
Merges and Nelson’s account, the transaction costs of doing so would likely
swamp the expected gains.55
Mark Lemley has also engaged in systematic analysis of IP improvement
doctrines, and he too rejects the strong property rights approach favored by Kitch.56
Lemley shares the concern that initial creators are not necessarily going to be the
ones with the best ideas for improvement,57 and he points out that it will be difficult
for the optimal improvers to make themselves known to the owner of a broad IP right

50. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 872.
51. Id.
52. Id. They explain,
For one thing, under rivalrous competition in invention and innovation there
is a stick as well as a carrot. Block rivalry and one blocks or greatly diminishes
the threatened costs of inaction. Kitch assumes a model of individual or firm
behavior where if an action is profitable it will be taken, regardless of whether
inaction would still allow the firm to meet its desired (but suboptimal)
performance goals.
Id.
53. Id. at 873.
54. Id. Because no one knows for sure what is likely to work, they argue, “[t]he only way
to find out what works and what does not is to let a variety of minds try.” Id.
55. Merges and Nelson support this contention by claiming that there is little evidence of
this kind of large scale licensing of IP rights to others. Id. at 874–75. For recent empirical
evidence, see Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015).
56. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1044.
57. Id. at 1048.
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due to information-disclosure problems.58 Lemley adds to the list of objections to
Kitch’s scheme concerns about transaction costs,59 uncertainty,60 externalities,61
strategic behavior,62 and noneconomic incentives.63 Ultimately, he proposes that
copyright law should adopt a system that incorporates some aspects of blocking
patents by altering its derivative-works and fair-use doctrines.64
These economic analyses of sequential innovation attempt to answer questions
about the appropriate scope of IP rights and whether copyright and patent laws should
operate under different principles. Underlying all of them is a series of, sometimes
explicit but often implicit, assumptions. These include some normative assumptions
about the goals of IP doctrine;65 and they also include descriptive assumptions about
the behaviors of creators. The next section addresses these.
D. A Behavioral Approach to Sequential Innovation
Although the topic of sequential innovation has received sustained attention from
theoretically oriented law and economics scholarship, the behavioral factors that
might affect how innovators respond to the ways that legal regimes structure
incentives have hardly been studied. The economic approaches that exist in the
literature have generally assumed that innovators are rational actors who more or less
accurately weigh the costs and benefits of behavior and respond predictably to the

58. This is the problem known as Arrow’s information paradox. See Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (1962). If
a would-be improver cannot obtain property rights in the possible improvement, he cannot
communicate to the patent owner without immediately rendering it valueless. If it is a good
idea, the patent owner can simply usurp it for himself. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1051.
59. Id. at 1054–55. He writes:
The presence of these costs in intellectual property licensing transactions
leads to two types of first-order deviations from the efficient behavior predicted
by economic models that do not account for transaction costs. First, some
original inventors will inefficiently choose not to license potential improvers for
their technology. This may happen either because the perceived value of
the improvements is sufficiently small that it is overwhelmed by the transaction
costs of licensing, or because the marginal value of having a third party (rather
than the original inventor) develop the improvements does not outweigh the
transaction costs of licensing. Second, some potential improvers who would seek
a license for their improvements will no longer do so because of transaction
costs.
Id. (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 1055–56.
61. Id. at 1056–58.
62. Id. at 1058–59.
63. Id. at 1059–60.
64. See id. at 1073.
65. For example, is the goal faster progress towards a single optimal solution or slower
development towards multiple optima? We discuss this issue infra note 177.
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options provided.66 Recent empirical research in the social sciences,67 and even
specific work in IP scholarship,68 has questioned this assumption.
1. Deciding To Innovate or Borrow
This Article begins to apply the insights of the behavioral literature to some
questions of sequential innovation. We begin with one of the principal decisions at
the heart of sequential innovation: whether the follow-on creator should borrow from
the existing creations or strike out and create something new. Of course, to a greater
or lesser extent, all new creations borrow from already-existing works.69 When the
existing works are protected by IP rights, however, the secondary creator must decide
whether to borrow from (and thus, usually, license) the existing works or whether to
avoid the scope of the IP rights by creating something sufficiently different from the
existing works. The specific question we are interested in, then, is how creators
decide whether to license existing IP rights or to “invent around” that IP by creating
something that does not infringe the patent or copyright. For the remainder of this
paper, we will refer to licensing IP as “borrowing” and inventing around IP as
“innovating.”70

66. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 6, at 994 (“In a private market economy, individuals
will not invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the
cost of doing so—that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the
endeavor.”).
67. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1729 (1998); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect
and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); see also Richard Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 45 (1980) (showing that
people respond differently to a situation referred to as a “cash discount” than to an identical
one labeled a “credit card surcharge”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981) (showing that people’s
preferences for an identical situation change depending on whether people imagine saving
lives or allowing people to die).
68. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 31, 36–39 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, The Creativity Effect];
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2010); Christoph Engel & Michael
Kurschilgen, Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial
Intervention into Blockbuster Deals, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 682 (2011); Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco & Zachary Burns, What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental
Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1405–20
(2013); Stefan Bechtold & Christoph Engel, The Price of Moral Rights: A Field Study (2015)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
69. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 87 (2012) (“[T]he well-known history of both classical and
contemporary art forms illustrates the centrality of copying within creative practice.”).
70. In some respects, this borrow/innovate decision bears strong parallels with the
make/buy decision that animates theory-of-the-firm analysis. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of
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Borrowing and innovating are both important aspects of creativity. Although
narratives of creativity stress “eureka” moments and pioneering achievements that
seem wholly original, these stories do not accurately capture the creative process.71
But more than just being descriptively inaccurate, this strict preference for novelty
and innovation is also normatively unjustified. Extreme innovations are not always
publicly valued.72 And, more importantly, in many situations innovation is socially
costly. Although creating around existing ideas may produce new ones, these new
ideas may not be better ones.73 And the costs in terms of time, research, and
experimentation that are necessary to produce innovations may vastly exceed the
price of a license to borrow from existing ideas. In these cases, borrowing is the
optimal strategy. Sometimes it is better to take the road less traveled and other times
it is better to stand on the shoulders of giants.74 Therefore, it is important to know
whether creators are choosing accurately between innovating and borrowing in
different creative contexts—and whether the law is affecting that choice for better,
for worse, or at all.
According to rational choice theory, a would-be creator faced with this
borrow/innovate decision should compare the costs and benefits of borrowing with
the costs and benefits of innovating. Borrowing entails a variety of costs, including,
primarily, licensing fees and transaction costs. Innovating, on the other hand, may
involve substantial investments in research and experimentation that borrowing does
not. Secondary creators must make tradeoffs between the respective costs of
licensing fees versus research and development. Thus, if the costs of borrowing
increase, all else equal, creators should be more likely to innovate.
In addition, because innovation always involves uncertainty, would-be innovators
must consider the extent to which innovation may even be possible.75 Sometimes
developing a new idea that does not infringe the rights of existing ideas will be easy,
but other times it will be incredibly difficult. Prior to experimenting, though, it can
be incredibly difficult to figure out which situation pertains. We can think of the
difficulty of innovating in terms of the proportion of the total “innovation space” that

the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). We have begun work on an article that spells out these
insights in more detail.
71. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015) (describing the responses of interviews with dozens of
creators about the processes and motivators of creativity).
72. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1441, 1479 (2010) (“In the arts, while the newness component of creativity is valued in our
individualist culture, for typical audience members and in most artistic contexts—as explained
herein—it is important that artists not stray too far from accepted conventions, a concern that
is not present in scientific and engineering invention.”).
73. It is for this reason that we prefer to focus on “creating around” rather than on
“improvements,” as some scholars do. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1351–58 (2015) (describing various scholars’ views regarding
improvements and inventing around and/or creating around).
74. To seriously mix metaphors.
75. Merges and Nelson explain, “In [Kitch’s] models the ‘fish’ or the ‘minerals’ are out
there and known (with perhaps some uncertainty) to all parties. But with the technological
‘prospects,’ and perhaps even real life mineral prospects, no one knows for sure what possible
inventions are in the technological pool.” Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 873.
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the existing IP-protected ideas cover.76 In an emerging field, innovating may be
relatively easy compared to a mature field where it is much harder to produce new
work. For example, coming up with an improvement in the field of grand piano
technology is hard these days, as most of the technological advances for this
instrument were made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.77 Compare this
to the relative ease of coming up with the new instrument of the
electroencephalophone, which uses brain waves to generate sounds.78 Accordingly,
the more innovation space that remains free to explore, the more likely follow-on
creators should be to innovate rather than borrow.
2. Biases in Rational Decision Making
An immense body of empirical research demonstrates that people often deviate
from the predictions of rational-choice theory when engaged in uncertain decision
making.79 People overweight some probabilities and underweight others.80 They
respond differently to situations that are identical except for slight differences in
framing.81 And they are sensitive to extraneous information that should not affect
their decisions.82 We are interested in the extent to which similar issues arise with
respect to creators’ innovate/borrow decisions.
In particular, we are interested in the role that heuristic decision making may play
in creators’ behavior. Making complex decisions about whether to borrow existing
ideas or create around them involves compiling and assessing a variety of different
information. As we described above, creators must compare the costs of innovating
with the ease of doing so. Behavioral science research has consistently shown that
when people are forced to make difficult decisions, they often simplify the task by
substituting easy questions for hard ones. This is known as heuristic decision
making.83 For example, when asked which is more likely, a word that starts with the
letter K or a word that has K as its third letter, people find it easier to think of the

76. Merges and Nelson refer to this as the “patent breadth” that a given IP right covers.
Ideas with lots of possible avenues for development are broad prospects, while those with few
avenues are narrow. Merges & Nelson, supra note 40, at 880–908.
77. Keith T. Comparetto, The Piano in History: A “Clever Bundle of Inventions”,
ALLEGRO PIANO PAGES, www.allegropianoworks.com/piano_history.htm [https://perma.cc
/EA9C-KYQD] (“By [1900], the instrument had reached such a degree of perfection that no
major change has occurred since.”).
78. Thomas R. Henry, Invention Locates Hurt Brain Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1943,
at 21.
79. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (surveying this research).
For applications of this research to the law, see Jolls et al., supra note 67.
80. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
81. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
82. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why
the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311 (2006) (noting that people’s judgments
of numerical quantities are biased by recent but unrelated numerical information).
83. KAHNEMAN, supra note 79, at 97–98.
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former than the latter, so they tend to say that a word that starts with the letter K is
more probable. In fact, it is less likely.84
Sometimes, as in the above example, heuristics lead to substantial errors. In other
cases, however, heuristics do very well and save on cognitive resources.85 Often, the
success of the heuristic depends on how well it is adapted to the situation. If the
information that is ignored by the heuristic is relatively unimportant, people may
make as good or even better decisions than do those using more traditionally
“rational” processes.86 If the ignored information is key to a decision, however,
people employing heuristics may perform very poorly. For example, heuristic
decision making can lead people to treat identical values as highly different and also
to treat very different values as identical. People often treat the same number of
deaths from disease differently when those deaths are referred to in the context of
“lives saved” rather than simply as “deaths.”87 And, on the contrary, people are often
willing to pay the same amount of money to save 2000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds.88
When people are asked to solve complicated problems, their brains often substitute
easier problems instead.
Given the complexity of innovate/borrow decisions, we anticipate that people are
likely to approach them heuristically. We expect that people may ignore important
information about the decision-making context, and that this ignorance may affect
the quality of the decisions that they make.
Our experiments model two features of sequential innovation decision making:
variations in the cost of borrowing and variations in the scope of innovation. They
allow us to test the assumptions that underlie the economic theories discussed above
and to study whether heuristics influence creators’ innovation behavior. We ask (1)
to what extent are creators’ innovate/borrow decisions sensitive to the costs of
borrowing IP; and (2) to what extent are creators’ innovate/borrow decisions
sensitive to the scope of the available solution space. To test the hypotheses
generated by the rational choice account, we have designed a series of experiments
in which subjects are randomly assigned to conditions that differ according to the
costs of borrowing and according to the available solution space.

84. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 211 (1973).
85. See GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GRP., SIMPLE HEURISTICS
THAT MAKE US SMART (1999). For example, physicians using the correct heuristic do a better
job of treating patients with heart conditions than do those who attempt to assess a wide range
of factors. For an excellent treatment of the relationship between the “heuristics and biases
school” and the “fast and frugal school” of heuristics scholarship see MARK KELMAN, THE
HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011).
86. GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2008)
(discussing situations in which heuristics work well).
87. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 67, at 453. In this study, subjects vastly preferred
a medical treatment when it was described as saving people’s lives compared to an otherwise
identical treatment when it was described as the number of people who would die.
88. William H. Desvousges, F. Reed Johnson, Richard W. Dunford, Sara P. Hudson, K.
Nicole Wilson & Kevin J. Boyle, Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent
Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 91, 94 (1993). This behavior is often known as “scope neglect.”
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II. EXPERIMENTS ON SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION
We ran a series of experiments designed to understand how people innovate
subject to constraints on their choices. This Part describes those experiments and
their results.
A. Experiments 1 and 2: Sensitivity to the Costs of
Borrowing and Innovating
Our first two experiments explore the extent to which creators are sensitive to
the costs associated with borrowing from existing IP. Existing rights impose
constraints on creators’ ability to solve problems, and they should be willing to pay
some amount of money to license existing rights to ease those constraints. Here,
we are interested in understanding how creators respond to changes in the costs of
borrowing from existing rights.
1. Experiment 1: Design
Our first experiment involved a computer-based creativity game derived from a
type of combinatorial optimization math problem known as a “knapsack problem.”
Subjects were told to imagine that they were traders in the Old West.89 Their goal
was to fill their covered wagons with a selection of goods that had maximal value
but that did not exceed the wagon’s weight limit.90 Subjects were told of the
wagon’s weight limit, then they were shown twelve items that may be placed in
the wagon. Each item had a dollar value and a weight. Subjects were given a time
limit (ninety seconds in each of these experiments) in which to play the game. The
game was scored based on the percentage of the maximum possible wagon value
(that is, if the maximum value of a wagon is $100 and a subject’s solution is worth
$80, the subject receives eighty points). Solutions that exceed the weight of the
wagon received zero points.

89. We hoped that some subjects might recall the Oregon Trail computer game of the
1990s and treat our game similarly.
90. We have used a similar version of this game in a recent paper. Christopher
Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 T EX . L.
R EV . 1921, 1949–50 (2014). To our knowledge, the first application of a knapsack
problem to innovation research was in Debrah Meloso, Jernej Copic & Peter
Bossaerts, Promoting Intellectual Discovery: Patents Versus Markets, 323 S CIENCE
1335 (2009).
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Figure 1. Practice Screen
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Subjects were first given a simple version of the game (see Figure 1) as practice
to familiarize themselves with the task. This session was untimed and unpaid. In the
live game, subjects were given ninety seconds to find a solution to a significantly
harder problem. This time period is generally too short to allow subjects to calculate
the correct answer.91 Instead, they must rely on heuristics to reach an answer. This
kind of heuristic problem solving is similar to the kinds of innovation that take place
in a number of fields, including computer science, biology, and engineering.
For our first experiment, we studied how people responded to variations in the
costs of innovating and borrowing. As we described above, borrowing from existing
creations is typically costly because those creations are covered by IP rights that must
be licensed. Accordingly, as the cost of borrowing increases, we would expect that
the rate of innovation will also increase, all else being equal. This experiment

91. Knapsack problems are NP-hard problems that are hard to solve mathematically. NP
problems are problems for which a polynomial time verification algorithm exists. See HANS
KELLERER, ULRICH PFERSCHY & DAVID PISINGER, KNAPSACK PROBLEMS 486–87 (2004).
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manipulates the costs of innovating and borrowing in order to assess subjects’
sensitivity to costs.
After the practice round but before they played the live game, subjects were told
that another subject had already played the game. Subjects were told that they would
be shown the other player’s submission and that the subject’s payouts would be based
on how many items from the other player’s submission they chose to use in their
submission. Subjects would receive a bonus for innovating—in this case, using two
or fewer of the items from the other player’s submission. They were told that their
score would be calculated as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. Experiment 1 score calculation
Use three or more items:

Use two or fewer items:

SS

SS + X

SS indicates the subject’s “submission score” as described above (percentage of
maximum score). X is the size of the bonus for innovating. Subjects were not told about
the quality of the given submission, but they could attempt to estimate it during gameplay.
We ran six different conditions in which X equaled 1, 8, 16, 32, 58, and 72
additional bonus points for innovating. This method allowed us to determine the
implicit value that subjects placed on borrowing versus innovating. In the standard
sequential innovation setting, borrowing comes with the cost of a license fee. Here,
instead of charging a fee to borrow, we paid subjects a bonus to innovate.92 The payout
structure can be viewed as an offer to the subject to innovate: Are you willing to take
X additional points in order to innovate instead of borrow? As the size of the bonus
increases, the percentage of subjects choosing to innovate should also increase.
We were able to estimate a rational indifference range (albeit not a single
indifference point) between borrowing and innovating by comparing the value of the
available solutions that borrow to the value of the available solutions that do not
borrow.93 The range at which rational subjects should be indifferent between

92. In theory, paying subjects to innovate should have similar incentive effects, although
the behavioral science research suggests that it may have different practical effects. Prospect
theory predicts that people will treat potential losses as more serious than they will treat
equivalent sized potential gains. This perception might affect the value that they implicitly
give the opportunity to innovate or borrow. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 81;
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 80.
93. In our experiment, 442 solutions led to a higher knapsack weight than the solution
provided to our subjects. If subjects decided to borrow, all of these solutions were available to
them; if subjects decided to innovate, only some of these solutions were available. As it was
impossible to identify these solutions in the given time frame and calculate their values,
subjects had to employ search heuristics. The precise indifference point between borrowing
and innovating depends on the assumptions employed regarding a rational subject’s search
strategy and heuristics. Possible heuristics include, among others, using items that have the
highest weight; using items that have the highest ratio of value over weight; focusing on a random
subset of potential solutions and selecting the best from this subset; or searching for an almost
optimal solution instead of a perfect solution. For an in-depth treatment of approximation
algorithms to knapsack problems, see KELLERER ET AL., supra note 91, at 29–42, 161–83. In
general, subjects who are better at the game should be willing to accept less to innovate than
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innovating and borrowing should fall between ten to twenty additional points for
innovating.94 Accordingly, we expected that very few subjects would be willing to
innovate for only one bonus point and that almost all subjects would innovate when
offered fifty-eight or seventy-two bonus points. In addition, we expected innovation
rates would be about 50% for conditions close to the indifference point.
Figure 2. Expected results: predicted percentage innovating
100
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subjects who are not as good at the game.
94. Among the various search heuristics that a rational subject could employ (see supra
note 93), we considered a handful of different approaches to determine indifference points.
Thus, we calculated the indifference points 1) for hypothetical subjects identifying the entire
solution space available to them if they decided to innovate or borrow, then randomly picking
twenty solutions from this space, choosing the best among these solutions for innovating and
borrowing, and then comparing their values (indifference point: 18.69); 2) for hypothetical
subjects identifying all solutions with the highest possible number of items, randomly picking
one solution for innovating and one solution for borrowing from this solution space, and
comparing their values (indifference point: 11.74); 3) for hypothetical subjects identifying all
solutions with either the highest or the second-highest possible number of items, randomly
picking one solution for innovating and one solution for borrowing from this solution space,
and comparing their values (indifference point: 14.94); 4) for hypothetical subjects identifying
all solutions with either the highest or the second-highest possible number of items, randomly
picking five solutions solution for innovating and five solutions for borrowing from this
solution space, choosing the best one each and then comparing their values (indifference point:
12.03); and 5) for hypothetical subjects identifying all solutions with either the highest or the
second-highest possible number of items, randomly picking twenty solutions for innovating
and twenty solutions for borrowing from this solution space, choosing the best one of each
and then comparing their values (indifference point: 9.19). This is based on a calculation of
the expected solution strengths if one reiterates the random selection processes described. The
calculated indifference points indicate the points at which these random selection processes
converge.
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After the subjects played the game, they were asked two comprehension questions
to ensure that they understood how the rules and payoffs worked. In addition,
subjects answered a number of demographic and follow-up questions regarding their
age, gender, education, primary language spoken, and self-perceived mathematical
ability. Subjects were also asked a general question about their risk tolerance,95 and
they completed a fifty-item personality inventory based on the “Big Five” theory of
personality.96
2. Experiment 1: Results
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), we recruited subjects to participate in
the experiment on creativity.97 Subjects were paid $0.50 as a show-up fee, and they

95. Subjects were asked: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?”
96. We used a fifty-item questionnaire from the International Personality Item Pool.
INT’L PERSONALITY ITEM POOL, http://ipip.ori.org [https://perma.cc/6LYL-3WAP]. The
precise questions were adapted from Ruth Maria Stock, Eric von Hippel & Lennart N.
Schnarr, Impacts of Personality Traits on Consumer Innovation Success (July 16, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467152 [https://perma.cc
/E224-R3F7]. See generally Lewis R. Goldberg, The Structure of Phenotypic Personality
Traits, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 26 (1993) (describing the history of the Big Five theory of
personality).
97. Subjects were recruited to participate in a study on creativity. There is an extensive
debate about how subjects recruited through AMT compare to traditional laboratory
experiments or other population. Some of that literature is cited below in this footnote. As
we discuss in Part III.C, however, we believe there are good reasons for using AMT in a
study like ours. For example, many of the criticisms of AMT relate to its representativeness
with respect to the U.S. population. The phenomena we are studying—creativity
behaviors—are carried out largely by people who resemble the AMT population, that is,
the young and technologically savvy. See Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel
S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351 (2012) (showing that AMT subject pools are often
more representative of the U.S. population than in-person convenience samples, but less
representative than subjects in Internet-based panels or national probability samples);
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivikins, Siddharth Suri & Jennifer Wortman Vaughan,
Incentivizing High Quality Crowdwork, 24 INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB 419 (2015),
available
at
http://www.www2015.it/documents/proceedings/proceedings/p419.pdf
(showing how performance-based payments improve quality of AMT participant
responses); John J. Horton, David G. Rand & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Online
Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON.
399 (2011) (showing similar internal and external validity of online experiments, compared
to laboratory and field experiments); Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine,
Cross-Sample Comparisons and External Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59 (2014)
(showing that AMT subjects behave differently than student and adult samples); Richard
N. Landers & Tara S. Behrend, An Inconvenient Truth: Arbitrary Distinctions Between
Organizational, Mechanical Turk, and Other Convenience Samples, 8 INDUS. &
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 142 (2015) (discussing sampling strategy in general); Leib
Litman, Jonathan Robinson & Cheskie Rosenzweig, The Relationship Between Motivation,
Monetary Compensation, and Data Quality Among US- and India-Based Workers on
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were paid an additional $0.03 per point they scored in the game. The minimum
payment was $0.50 and the maximum was $4.40. Five-hundred-ninety-eight subjects
participated in the experiment. From this pool, we removed 10 subjects who failed
an attention check at the end of the experiment. We also removed an additional 143
subjects who failed either or both of the comprehension questions that tested
subjects’ understanding of the rules and payouts. After removing another 13 subjects
who had gone over the weight limit, this left 432 subjects, of whom 58.8% were
male. There were no significant differences in the rates of being excluded between
the conditions.98
Our data present an unusual picture of subjects’ responsiveness to innovation
incentives. Overall, 68.06% of the subjects chose to innovate rather than borrow.
Surprisingly, however, we see almost no evidence of sensitivity to the magnitude of
the offered innovation bonus. Innovation rates for the subjects offered only one
additional bonus point were somewhat lower than for those offered eight additional
bonus points, but we see no significant differences in rates of innovation between
any of the other conditions. Substantial increases in bonuses had no meaningful
effect on innovation rates.
Table 2. Percentage innovating per bonus condition

Percentage (%) innovating

+1

+8

+16

+32

+58

+72

58.57

70.00

71.05

71.23

71.01

66.22

Note: +1 versus +8 condition: one-tail t-test, p = 0.079; two-tail t-test, p = 0.159.
+1 condition v. the mean of all other conditions: two-tail t-test, p = 0.070.
All other differences are nonsignificant.

Mechanical Turk, 47 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 519 (2015) (discussing optimal mechanisms
for improving data quality on AMT); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G.
Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION
MAKING 411, 417 (2010) (“Workers in Mechanical Turk exhibit the classic heuristics and
biases and pay attention to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional
sources.”); Dan Kahan, What’s a “Valid” Sample? Problems with Mechanical Turk Study
Samples, Part 1, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 8, 2013, 9:34 AM)
http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/8/whats-a-valid-sample-problems-with-mechanical
-turk-study-sam.html [https://perma.cc/4QU2-FAZH] (discussing the validity of study
samples in general); Dan Kahan, Fooled Twice, Shame on Who? Problems with
Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 2, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 10, 2013,
9:30 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/10/fooled-twice-shame-on-who
-problems-with-mechanical-turk-stud.html [https://perma.cc/59VN-N7B5] (discussing
problems of the AMT subject pool in general). Replication of the experiments reported in
this article in a social science laboratory is left to future work.
98. By condition, the number of subjects excluded for overweight wagons is as follows:
+1 = 1; +8 = 4; +16 = 5; +32 = 4; +58 = 2; +72 = 1. All comparisons are nonsignificant.
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Figure 3. Percentage innovating per bonus condition
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In sum, our subjects were surprisingly unmoved by alterations in the size of the
bonus provided for innovating. Although the bonus available for innovating
increased starkly between conditions, subjects were unresponsive to these changes.
Their insensitivity is striking at both the low and the high ends of the scale. At the
+1 bonus level, 58.57% of our subjects chose to innovate even though the incentive
to do so was minimal. The other player’s submission was a good one (it scored 90%
of the total points), so inventing around it was difficult. Faced with this difficulty,
subjects should not have been willing to forego the opportunity to borrow in favor of
a single point (equivalent to $0.03). Where we had expected to see little or no
innovating, in fact, more than half of the sample chose to innovate. The inverse is
true at the other end of the scale. Subjects in the +58 and +72 bonus conditions
received what should have been entirely supernumerary incentives to innovate, yet
barely more than two-thirds of subjects chose to do so. These subjects could have
increased their payments significantly, by 50% or more. With this many bonus points
at stake, subjects could have easily scored more by innovating, but many still decided
not to.
These anomalies in the extreme conditions had significant effects on the payouts
the subjects received. The nearly 60% of subjects who chose to innovate in the +1
condition scored significantly worse than did those who chose to borrow. And the
subjects who chose to borrow in the +32, +58, and +72 bonus conditions received
much smaller payouts than did those who innovated.99

99. As with all of the previous and subsequent analyses, these exclude the players who
entered submissions that exceeded the wagon’s weight limit. Because these players received
zero points, entering their data into this analysis would have produced unnecessary variability.
Players with overweight wagons did not different significantly between conditions. See supra
note 98.
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Table 3. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition

Innovators
Borrowers

+1

+8

+16

+32

+58

+72

77.15***
89.31***

84.45
90.43

92.13
86.41

107.92***
83.95***

133.86***
89.55***

148.20***
89.44***

Note: The stars indicate that the mean scores of innovators and borrowers within a particular
condition differ significantly. *** p < 0.01. All others are nonsignificant.
Figure 4. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition
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• Borrowers • Innovators
Significant numbers of our subjects were leaving money on the table. Their
innovate/borrow decisions were clearly suboptimal from the perspectives of both
individual welfare and social welfare. The scope of the individual suboptimal
behavior is readily apparent. Subjects who chose unwisely had significantly lower
returns.100 We can also estimate the social loss by comparing the actual points scored
for all players with the number of points that would have been scored had all of the
players chosen optimally. We will assume that all of the players would have received
the same scores as did those who chose optimally. In the +1 condition, the combined
score of innovators and borrowers was 8218. Had all the subjects borrowed,
however, they would have scored 8931 points, an 8.67% increase.101 In the +72
condition, the combined score of innovators and borrowers was 12,835. But had all
of the subjects innovated, their combined score would have been approximately
14,820, a 15.46% increase. These differences represent estimates of the lost social
welfare from suboptimal decision making.102

100. See supra Table 3 and Figure 4.
101. We arrived at these figures by adding the points scored by innovators with the points
scored by borrowers. To calculate the scores if everyone had played optimally, we assigned
the mean score of the borrowers to each of the innovators.
102. Creators who experience positive welfare from innovating or borrowing might offset
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Given the magnitude of these effects, it is important to ask why our subjects were
almost entirely unaffected by the size of the bonus offered for innovating and why
so many of them made suboptimal decisions. One possibility is that they were simply
not paying attention or trying terribly hard, and, thus, when confronted with the
instructions, they breezed through the game without thinking. We have a number of
reasons for doubting that this is the case. First, we discarded a number of subjects
who failed the comprehension or attention questions. Moreover, previous experience
with AMT subjects suggests that they are generally well motivated to perform these
kinds of tasks, especially when performance is linked with increased payment.103
Most importantly, subjects were asked a follow-up question about how easy they
thought it was to find a solution that did not borrow two or more of the items from
the other player’s submission. Looking at Figure 5, it seems that the easier subjects
thought innovating was, the more likely they were to innovate.
Figure 5. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating

Perceived Difficulty
(1 = most difficult, 6 = least difficult)
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• Borrowers • Innovators

We ran logistic regression analyses of these and other demographic and follow-up
questions. The regression tables are reported in Appendix A. They confirm that

these estimates. Thus, for example, if creators think that it is fun and challenging to innovate
their own solutions even when good ones already exist, their pleasure may help make up for
the costly expenditures of resources involved in innovating. Or if creators enjoy borrowing
even when a substantial share of the innovation space remains open, their enjoyment too could
conceivably explain, at least in part, why many subjects chose to borrow in conditions where
the bonuses heavily favored innovation.
103. See Sprigman et al., supra note 68, at 1405–11. In addition, most of our subjects took
the full ninety seconds to play the game, and their self-reported motivation to score well was
generally high. Over 88% of our subjects reported that they were motivated or highly
motivated to score well. If they were not trying hard, they could simply move some items to
the wagon and submit the game early.
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subjects were paying attention and responding rationally to the problem presented to
them, at least within the context of their own beliefs.104 Those subjects who were
innovating were likely doing so because they thought it was relatively easy to do
(whether it was or not).105 Accordingly, the decision to innovate in the +1 condition
might have been driven by overconfidence in the subject’s ability to find a
noninfringing solution.106 And the inverse is likely true for those who borrowed in
the high bonus conditions. They may have been insufficiently confident of how
easily they would be able to innovate and reap the large bonuses available.107
A further and related possibility is that our subjects’ insensitivity to the bonus size
suggests that there may be individual differences between people’s willingness to
engage in innovation. Raustiala and Sprigman have discussed the differences
between “tweakers,” who tend to make minor improvements on existing creations,
and “pioneers,” who prefer to attempt major innovations.108 Pioneers tend to receive
a lot of attention, because the scope of their innovations makes the value of their
contributions seem obvious. But tweakers are important too. Their efforts refine and
improve the initial pioneering innovation, helping to figure out the best way to
implement it. And by altering and adapting the innovation, tweakers point out its
flaws and prepare the ground for the next pioneer.109
Although there have been volumes of papers published on the relationship
between individual characteristics and creativity, as yet, we could find no research
directed to distinguishing between the creativity of tweakers and pioneers. We

104. See infra Appendix A, Regressions 4 and 5. In all regression analyses of Experiment
1, the ease with which subjects believed they would be able to innovate was strongly correlated
with whether they did, in fact, innovate. Interestingly, the easier subjects thought the game
was in general, the more likely they were to borrow rather than innovate. This makes sense:
because innovating restricts the sample of items that can be used, it should be easier to find a
solution when borrowing.
105. We cannot be sure that subjects’ beliefs were, in fact, causing their behavior because
their beliefs were reported after they played the game. It is possible that subjects who
innovated felt compelled to say that they found innovating easy and that subjects who
borrowed thought they needed to say that innovating was hard in order to justify their
behaviors.
106. We have seen similar kinds of overconfidence affect creators’ behavior in our earlier
experiments. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, supra note 68, at 42 (showing
that overconfidence in the quality of their work drives creators to assign high value to it).
107. One possibility is that the results of our first experiment are merely an artifact of the
experimental design based on the subject’s perception of the source of the provided
submission on which the subject is attempting to improve. In the real world, follow-on
innovators receive more information about existing ideas than in our first experiment. They
may know, for example, whether the original innovator was a very talented and bright
individual. In such case, follow-on innovators may consider it harder to “invent around” an
existing idea and therefore decide to borrow rather than innovate. We ran another experiment
to test whether subjects’ decisions to innovate or borrow are influenced by the perceived
quality of the original innovator. The design and results of this experiment are reported in
Appendix F, infra.
108. KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 132–33 (2012).
109. Id. at 137.
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examined responses to our follow-up questions to see if we could detect significant
differences between the groups. In particular, we were interested in whether there are
any specific demographic features of those people who innovated in the +1 bonus
condition (where innovating was irrational) and those people who borrowed in the
+58 and +72 bonus conditions (where borrowing was irrational).
One possibility is that pioneers tend to be risk takers, while tweakers are more
risk averse. Tweakers may be more cautious when confronted with uncertainty about
the possibilities for innovating and, thus, prefer to borrow from and tinker with
existing work. This hypothesis, however, is not borne out by our data. Subjects who
reported that they were generally “fully prepared to take risks” did not innovate at
significantly higher rates than did those who said that they “try to avoid taking
risks.”110
In addition, we considered whether innovation behavior was predicted by
variation in subjects’ personality traits. According to the five-factor model of
personality, variation along five different personality traits—openness to experience,
extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism—explains
individuals’ personality differences.111 In particular, we focused on openness to
experience and extroversion, because previous studies had shown these traits to be
positively correlated with creativity.112
Interestingly, subjects who rated highly on openness to new experience did, in
fact, innovate at significantly higher rates than did subjects who rated low on
openness. In regression analysis of innovation behavior controlling for the five
personality variables, as well as controlling for subject age and gender, higher

110. See infra Appendix A, Regression 2. Risk preference was never close to statistically
significant in any of the regression equations that we ran.
We used a single-item measure of risk preference taken from the following source. Thomas
Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner,
Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, and Behavioral Consequences, 9 J.
EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 522, 525 (2011). Recent research on risk preference suggests that it
is a complex concept that may vary across domains. Id. For example, people may be willing
to take risks with money at the betting table but unwilling to take risks with personal safety
while driving a car. Because we included the lengthy personality inventory, we decided to use
a smaller risk measure. Also, this research suggests that incentive-compatible techniques,
where subjects are really engaging in risky behaviors, have better predictive value. Because
our subjects were already engaging in one complex, risky game, we decided not to have them
play another incentive-compatible risk game. Further research using broader risk measures
and incentive-compatible measures is desirable.
111. See Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Robert R. McCrae, Four Ways Five Factors Are Basic, 13
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 653 (1992) (discussing support for the five-factor
model including observational studies, linguistic and cultural studies, and heritability studies).
112. See Sun Young Sung & Jin Nam Choi, Do Big Five Personality Factors Affect
Individual Creativity? The Moderating Role of Extrinsic Motivation, 37 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 941 (2009); Stock et al., supra note 96. The fifty-item measure that we used
included ten questions for each of the personality factors. Answers to these questions were
used to compute factor scores using the methods described in Stock et al., supra note 96. Factor
scores were then entered into the logistic regressions of innovation behavior reported in
Appendix A, infra.
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openness scores were correlated with increased likelihood of innovation.113 None of
the other personality factors was significantly correlated with innovation behavior.114
A one-point increase in openness on a scale of one to ten predicted a 32.9% increase
in likelihood of innovating.115
The relationship between openness to experience and innovation behavior makes
sense. Individuals who rate highly on openness tend to have a preference for variety
and change, and they tend to be intellectually curious. When faced with a creativity
problem, then, it is not surprising that subjects high in openness chose to branch out
in a new direction rather than continue down an already established path.
Although this finding about the relationship between personality and innovation
behavior is interesting, it is important to understand it in light of the larger context
of our study. When we consider the relative size of the effect of openness to
experience in explaining innovation behavior, it is much smaller than the size of the
effect associated with subjects’ beliefs about the ease of innovating.116 So although
the personality effect is statistically significant, it is not nearly as large as the effect
of subjective belief.
3. Experiment 2: Design
In Experiment 2 we attempted a partial replication of the results of Experiment 1
using a different creativity task. Instead of using a task based on mathematical
creativity, we designed a game related to verbal creativity. The game is similar to the
popular board game Scrabble, in which players attempt to compose words using a
list of letters with varying values. Subjects were told that their goal was to use the
letters to compose a list of six words with the highest possible value. They were paid
$0.50 for participating and an additional $0.01 for each point their list of words
scored.
Our subjects were given the list of letters in figure 6.
Figure 6. List of letters given to subjects

z50 K25 A5 E5 y20 P,5
113. See infra Appendix A, Regression 3.
114. When we include in the regression analysis controls for ease of solving the game and
ease of innovating, the correlation with openness becomes nonsignificant and the correlation
for extroversion becomes significant, but in the opposite direction than we had predicted.
People who score higher in extroversion are more likely to borrow than to innovate, controlling
for these other variables. We are unsure of what to make of this finding. See infra Appendix
A, Regression 4.
115. See infra Appendix A, Regression 3.
116. See infra Appendix A, Regressions 3 and 4. Regression 3, which only includes the
personality factors and age and gender as variables, has a low R2 value (0.028). This suggests
that little of the variation in innovation behavior is predicted by this model. Consider also that
the size of the coefficient for ease of innovating is much larger than the (nonsignificant)
coefficient for extroversion in Regression 4, which includes both.
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As in Experiment 1, subjects were told that another subject had played the game
before they did and entered a list of words. They were told, again, that they could
borrow from that player’s list of words, but that if they borrowed two or fewer words,
they would receive an additional bonus. The list of words provided by the other
subject was as follows:
zek, peak, pea, zap, key, aye117
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six different bonus conditions that
were similar in magnitude to those of Experiment 1.118 They were offered +1, +5,
+15, +35, +50, or +65 additional points if they used two or fewer of the other
subject’s words.119 We again attempted to assess the rational indifference point for a
player of moderate verbal ability, and we estimated that it should fall somewhere
around +15.120 Thus, subjects who were in the +1 condition should have been
unwilling to innovate for such a small payout given the constraint of doing so, and
subjects in the +50 and +65 conditions should have been very willing to innovate in
order to obtain so many additional points.
Subjects were given ninety seconds to enter their list of words. The game was
designed to automatically eject them from the study if they navigated off of the web
page during the game. This does not mean that subjects were unable to cheat, but the
short time limit should have limited opportunities to do so.
Once again, after subjects played the game they were asked two comprehension
questions and a series of demographic and follow-up questions.
4. Experiment 2: Results
Using AMT again, we recruited 707 subjects. From this pool, we removed 5
subjects who failed an attention check at the end of the experiment. Of the remaining
subjects, 103 opened another web page during the study and were excluded from the
analysis, as they may have used outside help (such as Scrabble word finders) which
could taint our analysis. We excluded another 58 subjects who failed on one or more

117. This list scored 235 points out of a highest possible 415 points.
118. Because subjects in Experiment 1 were paid $0.03 per point while those in Experiment
2 were paid $0.01 per point, the conditions actually varied more in the first experiment than
in the second. Nonetheless, our results show that subjects were more sensitive to these
differences in the second experiment than in the first.
119. We decided to implement the borrowing of words and not individual letters, in order
to make the game more tractable for our subjects.
120. Here, we estimated the indifference point by looking at the indifference points of three
separate hypothetical players. A player who knew the full dictionary of available words and
could play the best words would have been willing to innovate at any bonus higher than 0. A
player who knew the full dictionary of available words but who played words drawn at random
from that set would have been willing to innovate at any bonus higher than 15. And a player
who knew only the six lowest scoring words would have been willing to innovate at any bonus
higher than 35.
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of our various comprehension checking questions.121 This left 541 subjects, of whom
56% were male.
Our results in Experiment 2 are both similar and different from those of
Experiment 1. This time, we find that an increase in bonus size significantly increases
the percentage of subjects who choose to innovate.122 As one would expect, the more
money people are paid to innovate rather than borrow, the more likely they are, in
general, to do so.
Table 4. Percentage innovating per bonus condition

Percentage (%)
innovating

+1

+5

+15

+35

+50

+65

36.67
(a)(b)

39.02
(c)

38.89
(d)

47.47
(e)

49.45
(a)

59.55
(b)(c)(d)(e)

(a) +1 versus +50 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.082.
(b) +1 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.002.
(c) +5 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.007.
(d) +15 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.005.
(e) +35 versus +65 condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.095.
All other comparisons are nonsignificant.
Figure 7. Percentage innovating per bonus condition
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121. The excluded subjects came from the following conditions: 14 were cut from the 1
point group; 9 were cut from the 5 point group; 7 were cut from the 15 point group; 4 were cut
from the 35 point group; 10 were cut from the 50 point group; and 14 were cut from the 65
point group. There were no significant differences in exclusion rates by condition.
122. Rather than comparing individual conditions against one another, we analyze the
effect of bonus size in regression analyses that control for other variables as well. See infra
Appendix C. In these regressions, bonus condition is a significant predictor of subjects’
innovation behavior. This was not true for Experiment 1.
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That we found a positive relationship between innovation and bonus size in
Experiment 2 and not in Experiment 1 is somewhat surprising because the actual
magnitude of the differences between the conditions was smaller in the second
experiment. In Experiment 1, each “point” was paid $0.03, while in Experiment 2,
each “point” was paid $0.01. For some reason, though, subjects were more
responsive to the size of the bonus here than in the prior experiment.
Despite the positive effect of bonus size, subjects’ innovate/borrow decisions
were, as in Experiment 1, far from what one might have predicted. Importantly, the
results in Experiment 2 track those in Experiment 1 in that far too many subjects
innovated at low bonus amounts, while too many subjects borrowed at high bonus
amounts. At the +1 bonus level, 36.67% of our subjects chose to innovate even
though the incentive to do so was minimal. Given that the other player’s solution
already scored 56% of the total points, subjects decided to forego the opportunity
to borrow in favor of a single point (equivalent to $0.01 in this experiment). While
the rate of innovation was lower than in Experiment 1, we still saw more than a
third of our subjects innovate at the +1 bonus level. And similar to Experiment 1,
the reverse is true at the other end of the scale. Subjects in the +65 bonus condition
had a large incentive to innovate, but still 40% of our subjects in this condition
decided to borrow.
As in Experiment 1, these anomalies had effects on the subjects’ payout. The
third of our subjects who chose to innovate in the +1 bonus level condition scored
worse than did those who chose to borrow. And borrowers in the +65 bonus level
condition performed worse than innovators.123 Accordingly, we observed that
subjects who chose the wrong strategy lost money relative to those who chose the
optimal strategy.
Table 5. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition

Innovators
Borrowers

+1

+5

+15

+35

+50

+65

235.24***
284.47***

230.78***
273.54***

253.57***
286.91***

283.19***
287.88***

288.67
286.96

305.66
283.89

Note: The stars indicate that the mean scores of innovators and borrowers within a particular
condition differ significantly. *** p < 0.01. All other comparisons are nonsignificant.

123. Interestingly, these results suggest that we may have underestimated the indifference
point for our subjects. It was not until the +35 condition that innovators scored about as well
as borrowers did. Our subjects apparently found coming up with their own nonborrowing
words more difficult that we had initially predicted. Nonetheless, many of them still chose to
innovate in the low bonus conditions.
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Figure 8. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition
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• Borrowers • Innovators

In Experiment 1, the principal driver of subjects’ innovate/borrow decisions appears
to have been their subjective belief about how easy innovating was. The easier they
thought it was to innovate, the more likely they were to do so.124 We found the same to
be true in Experiment 2.125 Participants who said they found it difficult to innovate tended
to borrow from the provided solution, across all conditions. In fact, subjective beliefs
were a much stronger predictor of innovation behavior than was bonus size.
Figure 9. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating
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124. See supra note 104.
125. Again, we cannot be sure about the causal effect of subjects’ beliefs. See supra note 105.
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The visual impression from both figures is confirmed by the regressions in
Appendix C. The perceived ease of solving the game and of innovating are
significant predictors of whether a subject chooses to innovate or not.
Similar to Experiment 1, it seems that subjects who were innovating were doing
so because they thought it was relatively easy to do (whether this was correct or not).
However, none of our other follow-up or demographic questions was a significant
predictor of behavior, including, in this experiment the personality factors.126
5. Bringing Experiments 1 and 2 Together
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are illuminating. We interpret them as
suggesting that creators can be modestly responsive to objective changes in the costs
and benefits of innovating versus borrowing. Far more important, however, are
creators’ subjective beliefs about innovation environments. What seems to matter
most to creators’ innovate/borrow decisions is whether they believe that innovating
will be easy or difficult. This implies that our subjects are performing in a way that
is rationally consistent with their own beliefs, but, as these experiments show, those
beliefs often lead to suboptimal behavior when they are not combined with other
relevant information.
We think that our subjects were confronting the innovate/borrow problem at the
heart of these experiments using a heuristic based on the ease of innovating.
Heuristics typically involve the substitution of an easier question for a harder one.127
In these experiments the question of whether to innovate or borrow required subjects
to think about both (1) how easy it was to come up with an innovative
(nonborrowing) solution and (2) how valuable the innovative solution was compared
to how valuable the borrowing solution was. Our subjects, however, seem to have
only focused on the first of these. Thus, subjects in the low bonus conditions who
thought it was easy to develop nonborrowing solutions chose to innovate even though
doing so limited their options without substantial compensation. And some subjects
in the high bonus conditions who thought it was difficult to find nonborrowing
solutions borrowed despite the very strong inducement to play an innovating
solution.
The innovate/borrow decisions in our game were not particularly complex, but
many subjects still seem to ignore relevant information that would help them make
these decisions better. Partly, this is the result of the short time period they had to
solve the problems. Perhaps, if they were given more time, they would have been
able to combine all of the information necessary to optimally play the game.
Although real-world creators typically have far more time to engage in these sorts of
decisions, the information that they have to assess is substantially more complex.
Given the difficulty of the decisions they face, they might be just as likely to rely on
heuristics to solve problems as our subjects were.

126. See infra Appendix C.
127. See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
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B. Experiments 3 and 4: Sensitivity to the Quality of Existing Ideas
The previous experiments explored the extent to which subjects’ innovation
behavior was influenced by the costs of borrowing or innovating. Our data suggest
that the costs of borrowing played a relatively little role in their decisions to borrow
or innovate. But these are not the only relevant factors this decision involves.
Rational people should also consider how difficult it will be to make a new discovery
that does not infringe upon existing ideas. We refer to this as the scope of the
innovation space.128 When the scope of the innovation space is large, people should
be more willing to innovate (all else equal) than when it is small, because it will be
easier to find a noninfringing solution.
Two variables affect the scope of the innovation space: the quality of the existing
ideas and the strength of the IP rights protecting them.129 For example, a new
discovery may open up an entire field of research that is only barely touched by
existing IP rights. The early days of most fields look like this. But as the field
matures, it will tend to be harder and harder to produce new works or inventions that
do not overlap with existing ones. In the same way, if the breadth of the existing IP
rights increases, such that new creators have to produce ideas with fewer similarities
to the existing ideas, innovation will become harder, and borrowing from the existing
ideas will be more attractive.
The prior two experiments suggested that people were particularly sensitive to
their own beliefs about how large the innovation space was. The easier they thought
it would be to innovate, the more likely they were to do so. Those experiments used
subjects’ self-reports about the scope of the innovation space. Here, in Experiments
3 and 4, we test the extent to which subjects are responsive to changes in the
innovation space derived from the quality of the underlying ideas by objectively
manipulating the quality of the given solutions.
1. Experiment 3: Design
Experiment 3 used the same wagon-creativity task and experimental software
program as in Experiment 1. Whereas Experiment 1 manipulated the costs and
sources of the underlying ideas, Experiment 3 manipulated the quality of the
underlying ideas. After going through the practice game, subjects were given the
same instructions about the nature of the game and the distribution of points. Subjects
were told that they would receive an additional sixteen points if their submission did
not use three or more of the items from the existing submission.
Then subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions based on the
strength of the underlying submission. Depending on condition, subjects were either
shown a submission that was 60%, 80%, or 100% of the maximum possible score.
Subjects were not told how strong the submission was, but they should have been
capable of making informed judgments about it.130 While the 60% solution afforded

128. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
130. For example, as submission strength increased, so too did the number of items used
in the submission.
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many valuable options that subjects could choose that did not involve borrowing, the
100% solution offered very few, and the 80% solution was in the middle. Subjects
then played the game, answered two comprehension questions, and answered a series
of follow-up and demographic questions similar to those used in the previous
studies.131
The sixteen-point bonus offered to all subjects should fall near subjects’ rational
indifference point in the 80% condition. In this condition, the offer of sixteen points
for innovating produced options that were about equally good for either choice. In
the 60% condition, though, because the innovation space was so much larger,
subjects should tend to accept the bonus at very high rates, and we should see near
universal innovating. On the contrary, in the 100% condition, the available
innovation space was very small (although not zero),132 so almost all subjects should
eschew the bonus and borrow.
2. Experiment 3: Results
We recruited 303 subjects via AMT to participate in the study. As with the
previous experiments, subjects were paid $0.50 for participating and $0.03 for each
point that they scored in the game. We excluded 62 subjects from the final data
analysis for missing one of the comprehension questions, not being native English
speakers, or missing an attention question. Exclusions did not differ significantly
between the three conditions. Of the remaining population of 241 subjects, 143
(59.34%) were male, with a mean age of 33.04 (range 19–68).
Our results are partly consistent with our expectations and partly inconsistent with
them. As predicted, when confronted with a smaller innovation space, subjects were
less likely to innovate and more likely to borrow. Subjects in the 60% condition
innovated more than those in the other conditions. Although subjects in the 80%
condition innovated more than those in the 100% condition, we cannot say that the
result was statistically significant. In general, then, we observe some degree of
sensitivity to the scope of innovation space, but it is not as great as we would have
predicted.133

131. Experiment 3 did not include the fifty-item personality inventory.
132. In addition to the 100% solution provided to the subjects, three other 100% solutions to
the knapsack problem exist. If a subject chooses to innovate and comes up with one of the other
100% solutions, he will always be better off than by choosing to borrow, as he not only receives
the payoff for the 100% solution but also the sixteen point bonus for innovating. But the likelihood
that a subject will come up with one of three other 100% solutions is small, given that there are
over 3000 possible solutions to the knapsack problem, whose quality ranges from 0 to 100%.
133. We also do not observe statistically significant differences between the mean scores
of innovators versus borrowers:
Table 6. Mean scores of innovators versus borrowers by condition

Innovators
Borrowers

60%

80%

100%

94.32
85.40

90.58
86.22

88.38
85.54

All differences between innovators and borrowers within a condition are nonsignificant.
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Table 7. Percentage innovating per condition

Percentage (%) innovating

60%

80%

100%

80.77
(a)(b)

69.33
(a)(c)

60.23
(b)(c)

(a) 60% versus 80% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.102.
(b) 60% versus 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.004.
(c) 80% versus 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.231.

Moreover, as in our previous studies, innovation rates are still unusually distributed.
Although innovation rates were higher in the 60% condition, they did not reach the
nearly universal level that rational choice theory would have predicted. And on the
opposite side of the spectrum, in the 100% condition, more than half of the subjects
still chose to innovate even though doing so was incredibly difficult. So although the
scope of the innovation space is affecting subjects’ decisions, the magnitude of its
effect is still relatively small.134 Again, when we look at our follow-up and
demographic data, we can tell a richer story about innovation behavior. The changes in
innovation rates across conditions and subjects’ within-condition innovation behavior
are related to their perceptions of how easy they thought it was to innovate (for
example, find a solution using 2 or fewer previously used items). Within each
condition, those subjects who innovated believed that doing so was significantly easier
than did those who borrowed (see Figure 10 below).135
Figure 10. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating
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134. Regression analysis of the three conditions with no other controls yields an R2 value
of only 0.029, indicating that differences between the conditions explain very little of the
overall variation in subjects’ decision making. See infra Appendix C, Regression 1.
135. All p’s < 0.05.
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Logistic regression analysis of a full set of these data indicates that the strongest
correlation with innovation was subjects’ beliefs about how easy it was to
innovate.136 For every one-point increase (on a six-point scale) in how easy subjects
thought it was to find a solution using two or fewer items from the other submission,
they were 280.1% more likely to innovate.137 This is important for two reasons. First,
it suggests, again, that our subjects were playing the game rationally and consistently
with their perceptions of how easy it was to innovate. Second, it suggests that
subjects’ perceptions of the ease of innovating were much more important than the
objective ease of innovating when it came to their actual behavior. When deciding
whether to innovate or borrow, subjective beliefs appear to be much more influential
than the actual state of the world. That said, we cannot say that subjects’ perceptions
about ease of innovating caused them to innovate or borrow. It is at least possible
that subjects’ responses to our question about ease of innovation were driven by what
they chose to do, rather than the other way around.
That said, the strength of the correlation between the choice whether to innovate
or borrow and perceived ease of innovation suggests to us that subjects are playing
the game consistently with their subjective beliefs about the difficulties of
innovating. For that reason, we do not wish to label their behavior “irrational.” But
their strategies were not necessarily optimal.138 Consider the subjects in the 60%
condition, where innovating was relatively easy and most subjects innovated.
Those who did not innovate, approximately one-fifth of the group, scored much
lower than did those who innovated (innovators mean score = 94.32; borrowers
mean score = 85.40).139 Although the borrowers may have been playing
consistently with their own beliefs, those beliefs may have led them astray.140
Comparing these results to those of our previous experiments, it appears as though
subjects’ innovation decisions are more sensitive to changes in the quality of existing
solutions to a problem than they are to the costs of innovating or to information about
the source of an existing solution. Whereas Experiments 1 and 2 showed small
differences in innovation behavior despite large differences in cost, Experiment 3

136. See infra Appendix C, Regression 4.
137. See infra Appendix C, Regression 4.
138. Their behavior is consistent with what is often referred to as “bounded rationality.”
See HERBERT A. SIMON, 1 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1982); Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 1, 4 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten
eds., 2002) (“[M]odels of bounded rationality describe how a judgment or decision is reached
(that is, the heuristic processes or proximal mechanisms) rather than merely the outcome of
the decision . . . .”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).
139. One-tailed t-test, p = 0.059.
140. The scores of the two groups in the other two conditions were much closer together.
80% Condition: innovators = 90.58; borrowers = 86.22 (p = 0.12). 100% Condition: innovators
= 88.38; borrowers = 85.54 (p = 0.13). The success of the innovators in the 100% condition is
also interesting. Here, even though innovating should have been a suboptimal strategy given
the strength of the provided submission, innovators were still able to score at least as well as
borrowers. Perhaps this suggests that some of these innovators were rationally choosing to
innovate because, at least for them, it was more promising. Further research is necessary to
understand this issue.
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produced some significant differences in innovation with changes in the actual
quality of the underlying solution. In none of these cases, however, is innovation
behavior fully consistent with rational choice predictions: when innovation is costly
or difficult many subjects still choose to innovate, and when innovation is cheap and
easy some subjects still choose to borrow. This suggests that there may be strong
individual differences or other unobserved variations affecting innovation behavior.
Moreover, these innovation decisions often lead to suboptimal outcomes for
significant portions of our subject pool.
3. Experiment 4: Design
To more fully understand the nature of creators’ decisions, we chose to run
another experiment as a partial replication of our findings in Experiment 3. As above,
we shifted from a mathematical creativity task to a verbal creativity task, using the
Scrabble-style game described in Experiment 2. The game worked the same way that
it did in Experiment 2. Subjects were given the same set of letters and point values
and were instructed to create a list of words that maximized their value. They were
paid $0.01 per point.
Again, subjects were told that another subject had played the game before them
and entered a list of words. If they borrowed two or fewer words from the other
player’s list, they would receive an additional sixteen points. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of three separate conditions that varied in the quality of listed words.
In one condition, the list scored 60% of the maximum score; in the second condition,
it scored 80% of the maximum score; and in the third condition, it scored the
maximum number of points possible.141
Because the provided list covered an increasing percentage of the available
innovation space across the conditions, we anticipated that subjects would be less
willing to innovate for the same bonus in the 100% condition than they would in the
60% and the 80% conditions.142
After completing the game, subjects answered two comprehension questions and
a series of follow up and demographic questions.
4. Experiment 4: Results
We recruited 372 subjects to participate in the study via AMT. As in the previous
studies, subjects were paid $0.50 to participate, and they were capable of earning
more money based on their performance. Of the original pool, 54 were automatically
eliminated from the experiment for violating the rules and opening up a separate

141. The word lists were as follows. 60% Condition: zap, aye, kea, pay, key, pea (60.2%
of the maximum score). 80% Condition: zek, pay, zap, key, peak, yep (79.5% of the maximum
score). 100% Condition: zek, peaky, zap, zep, kype, zea (100%, the maximum score).
142. In fact, the innovation space is effectively zero in the 100% condition. As opposed to
Experiment 3 (see supra footnote 132), only one 100% solution existed in Experiment 4. That
solution scored the maximum of 415 points. If a subject decided to innovate in this condition
(i.e., borrow only up to two words from the given solution), the best solution he could produce
would score 350 points and 16 bonus points (for borrowing). As a result, subjects in the 100%
condition are always better off borrowing than innovating.
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Internet browser window during the creativity game. Of the remaining subjects, two
subjects who did not speak English as their primary language were cut, as were 43
subjects who failed one of the comprehension questions or the attention check. This
left 273 subjects, of whom 46.9% were female, in the final pool.
Between the 60% and 80% conditions, our results look like what we would expect
based on Experiment 3. In the 60% condition, 46.81% of subjects innovated a word
list that borrowed two or fewer words, while in the 80% condition, only 40.91%
innovated. This is consistent with a rational approach to playing the game. When the
innovation space shrinks, creators should be more willing to borrow from the existing
IP rights.
Table 8. Percentage innovating per condition

Percentage (%) innovating

60%

80%

100%

46.81
(a)(b)

40.91
(a)(c)

85.71
(b)(c)

(a) 60% vs. 80% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.426.
(b) 60% vs. 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.000.
(c) 80% vs. 100% condition: two-tail t-test, p = 0.000.

A strange thing happened in the 100% condition, however. Here, although
innovating a solution that would score better than the existing solution was
impossible, 85.7% of subjects chose to innovate rather than borrow. Not only did the
percentage of innovators fail to decrease as expected, it actually doubled in size
compared to the 80% condition.
We believe that the oddness of these results was caused by subjects’ response to
the words in the other player’s submission. In the 100% condition, the word list
included words that would not have been familiar to many subjects (zek, peaky, zap,
zep, kype, zea). Coming up with words that did not borrow from this list was
comparably easy, since many of the more familiar words (for example, peak, pea,
key, pay) were still available. When subjects began to contemplate whether to
innovate or borrow, they likely assessed how easily they could come up with words
that did not borrow from the existing solution. Because this was relatively easy in
the 100% condition compared to the 60% and 80% conditions, subjects probably
concluded that innovating was the optimal strategy. In doing so, however, they
ignored the relative value of the words that were in the existing solution compared
to the value of the words that they were creating.
The failure of this strategy is starkly apparent in the scores of innovators and
borrowers in each of the conditions. In each of the conditions, borrowers scored
significantly more points than innovators.
Table 9. Mean scores of innovators vs. borrowers by condition

Innovators
Borrowers

60%

80%

100%

223.86
248.20

216.67***
287.50***

263.59***
390.00***

Note: The stars indicate that the mean scores of innovators and borrowers within a particular
condition differ significantly. *** p < 0.01. The other comparison is nonsignificant.
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But in the 100% condition, borrowers scored more than 100 points higher than
innovators (390.0 versus 263.50). This represents a huge loss in welfare for the
participants, and by proxy, for society.143 These innovators faced a perfect solution
already available to them and chose to create new ones anyway.
When we analyze our follow-up and demographic data, we again see that
subjects’ estimates of the ease of innovating a solution were the strongest predictor
of innovation behavior.144
Figure 11. Mean perceived difficulty of innovating
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This suggests that subjects were once again playing according to their own sense
of what was rational to do. And, once more, we failed to find any significant effects
of age, gender, education, risk, language ability, or previous experience with
Scrabble. When we examine the personality data, we did, this time, detect a
significant although not very strong relationship between the personality factor of
openness to new experience and innovation.145 The significance disappears,
however, when other variables are considered in the regression, so we are hesitant to
put substantial weight on it.

143. Again, if creators receive positive welfare from innovating versus borrowing, it could
offset the magnitude of these estimates. See supra note 102. There is, however, no reason to
think that subjects in the 100% condition would value innovating so much more than would
subjects in the other conditions. Presumably, whatever benefit subjects receive from
innovating should be fairly consistent across conditions, so while it might make sense for some
creators to take less money to innovate than they would receive to borrow, they should not
presumably be willing to take so much less money in the 100% condition as they appear to.
144. See infra Appendix E.
145. See infra Appendix E.
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The results of Experiment 4 shed interesting light on our findings from
Experiment 3. In both cases, we found some evidence of subjects responding
rationally to changes in the scope of the innovation space. But, rather than engage in
the complex comparison of the relative values of the innovating and borrowing
solutions, subjects seem to have relied on a heuristic assessment of ease of
innovating. For the most part, this was a wise choice. It was no longer the wise
strategy, however, for the 100% condition of Experiment 4. There, subjects could
easily generate a list of words that did not borrow from the given solution. In
choosing to innovate at such high rates, however, they ignored the value of their own
words compared to the words in the given solution. Although innovating was easy,
it was not smart. In this case the heuristic led them astray.
III. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Regulating sequential innovation is perhaps the most important challenge IP law
faces. In one sense, all IP doctrine and theory come down to the fundamental issue
of balancing incentives for initial creators and opportunities for subsequent creators.
In order to determine how to do so efficiently, the law needs an accurate
understanding of how people make decisions about innovating and borrowing. More
research needs to be done in this area, but our findings have interesting implications
for IP law and policy. We will break them out into four separate sections. First, we
will discuss the implications of our findings for the efficiency of innovation markets.
We will then consider how (and how well) IP law affects creators’ incentives. Then,
we will address issues associated with the production and acquisition of creativity.
Finally, we will discuss some limitations to our study design and future research that
we plan to undertake.
Before we discuss the implications of our findings for IP law, we should keep two
important points in mind. First, when we think about “creativity,” we tend to think
about the kinds of ideas that represent substantial advancements from existing
knowledge: Edison and the light bulb, Picasso and cubism, Perry and “Firework.”
This kind of pioneering creativity is obviously important; it is the source of Nobel
prizes and MacArthur genius grants. Yet despite all of the attention that it receives,
it represents a relatively small percentage of human creative endeavor.146 At least as
important are the innumerable tinkerers and tweakers whose only goal is to refine
and adapt existing ideas.147 Quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, this kind of
creativity is responsible for at least as much scientific and artistic progress as the
pioneering kind. For every Edison, Picasso, and Perry, there are dozens, hundreds,
or thousands of others who have continued to develop, interpret, and repurpose their
ideas.148

146. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 108, at 132–33.
147. Eric von Hippel has done important research on the social value of user innovation
which often takes the form of tweaking existing products for new uses. See ERIC VON HIPPEL,
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); Joachim Henkel & Eric von Hippel, Welfare
Implications of User Innovation, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDWIN MANSFIELD 45 (Albert N.
Link & F.M. Scherer eds., 2005).
148. Consider, for example, the large and growing arena of fan fiction. Fans write their
own stories using existing (often copyrighted) characters, placing them in new settings or
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Second, when we think about innovation we tend to ascribe to it a positive
normative valence. But as Kitch pointed out, sometimes innovation is costly and
wasteful.149 If one drug successfully treats a disease, the addition of a second or third
drug to treat the same disease may not be that valuable, especially compared to the
use of those resources elsewhere.150 Innovation races and inventing around patents
often lead to duplicative expenses without actual improvements in idea quality.151
Our creativity games allow for this. Subjects might choose to innovate rather than
borrow, but their innovation does not necessarily produce a higher score. IP and
innovation scholars need to be clear about when innovation is valuable and when it
is costly.
A. The Efficiency of IP Markets
Similar to other areas of the law, the fundamental structure of U.S. IP law is
premised on the assumption that the people affected by it—creators, owners, and
users—are rational. In this sense, rationality means seeking to maximize one’s
welfare by comparing the costs and benefits of decisions and acting consistently with
that calculus.152 Rationality does not mean that people don’t make mistakes, only that
those mistakes will tend to be randomly distributed over time or in a society. If a
person overestimates the costs of an action this time, he is likely to underestimate
those costs the next time, and may improve his estimates in the long term.153 Or if a
market participant always overestimates the costs of an action, another market
participant will always underestimate them.154 In markets where there are both

changing other aspects of their identities and relationships. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and
the New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (1997) (“‘Fan fiction,’ broadly
speaking, is any kind of written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular
culture, such as a television show, and is not produced as ‘professional’ writing.”).
149. Kitch, supra note 43, at 278–79.
150. The existence of multiple drugs to treat the same disease will have some possible
social welfare effects by increasing competition and thus reducing monopoly pricing. But
competition will occur inevitably once the patents expire.
151. For a discussion of these issues see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent
Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 817–18 (2007).
152. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2000)
(“[T]he basic requirement of expected utility theory is that decision makers conduct an explicit
or implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method of
achieving their goals . . . .”).
153. See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 114–18 (2006) [hereinafter Epstein, Behavioral
Economics]; Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 803, 810–14 (2008); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual
Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 219–21 (2006); Alan Schwartz, How
Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 143 n.17 (2008).
154. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18–19 (9th ed. 2014) (“The
fact that people do not always make rational choices does not invalidate rational choice theory;
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rational and biased actors, marginal buyers and sellers who determine equilibrium
prices in the aggregate will often be rational individuals. Their rational behavior can
wield sufficient influence to lead to an efficient market, from which biased
individuals can also profit.155 Over time and on balance, learning and imitation
strategies lead rational actors engaged in market transactions to converge toward
optimal behavior.
In an ideal world, in which people act rationally and there are no transaction costs,
innovation markets should function efficiently to direct resources to their highest
value uses.156 As we described in Part I, rational follow-on creators will weigh the
costs and benefits of innovating and borrowing and select the optimal approach.157 If
the owner of the underlying IP right insists on too high of a price to license it, the
rational creator will innovate; or if the scope of the remaining innovation space is
exceedingly narrow, the downstream creator will be willing to pay more to borrow
from existing ideas. In this ideal world, the role of the IP system is simply to establish
clear rights and allow people to transact. Social welfare is optimized by individuals
rationally pursuing their private good.158
Our experiments examine how people choose between innovating and borrowing.
The hypothesis that undergirds IP law is that the choice can be shaped by external
incentives. But the subjects in our experiments were, at best, mildly responsive to
external incentives. Choices between innovation and borrowing correlated much
more powerfully with their internal, subjective beliefs about the difficulty of
innovating than with the optimal balance of costs and benefits. Our findings in these
experiments suggest that markets for innovation may be less efficient than standard
economic analysis assumes. Moreover, these inefficiencies may produce significant
social costs. Although our data are far from conclusive, they are consistent with a
growing body of research noting similar departures from rationality in other aspects
of innovation, which raise the possibility of inefficiencies inhering in those aspects
as well.159

random deviations from rational behavior will cancel out.”); Epstein, Behavioral Economics,
supra note 154, at 121; Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1556–57 (1998).
155. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–13
(2008). On a similar problem involving information asymmetries between producers and
consumers, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics:
An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1021 (1985); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979); Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, Equilibrium
Comparison Shopping, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 543, 543–44 (1979).
156. This is simply an application of the Coase Theorem to innovation markets. See R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (establishing the conditions in
which markets will function to efficiently distribute resources through society).
157. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
158. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (“[C]opyright law serves public
ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.”).
159. See Brüeggeman et al., supra note 5, at 14 (finding that property rules lead to
inefficient distributions of creative goods compared to liability rules); Buccafusco &
Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, supra note 68, at 42 (finding that creators’ optimism about
the quality of their works leads to overpricing and market inefficiencies); Andrew W. Torrance
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The results of our experiments indicate that many of our subjects were making
suboptimal innovate/borrow decisions, at least in the sense of reducing their
payoffs,160 and that these decisions had significant effects on the total “welfare”
produced in the games. For example, in the +1 condition of Experiment 1, where the
rational choice was borrowing, more than half of our subjects innovated, and in the
+72 condition, where the rational choice was innovating, almost a third of our
subjects borrowed. Implicitly, this means that the least amount of money that these
subjects were willing to accept to innovate was significantly skewed from what
rational choice would predict. This seems to be due primarily to the overoptimism of
the first group and the “underoptimism” of the latter about how easy it would be to
create a noninfringing solution. The setup of our experimental task even allowed us
to provide a rough estimate of the social welfare losses accrued due to these
deviations from rational behavior.161
Experiment 4 demonstrates very clearly one way in which creators’ decisions may
fail to conform to welfare-maximizing expectations. Decisions about creating are
complex, and when faced with complex decisions, people often substitute easy
questions for harder ones.162 They use what we call innovation heuristics. Sometimes
this works well, but as our experiment showed, sometimes it fails miserably. Many
subjects in the 100% condition thought it was easy to come up with new words, but
they neglected to consider how valuable the available words were. Accordingly, they
made substantially less money in the game than did those who chose to borrow from
the existing solution.
To appreciate how these heuristics might affect a real IP transaction, consider a
situation in which a research scientist is trying to develop a gene therapy treatment
for a disease. She knows that another inventor owns a patent on a technology that
relates to her work and that the inventor is willing to license it for a small fee. Our
scientist, however, is exceedingly confident that she can work around the existing
patent and avoid paying the fee. She can see an available method that might not
infringe the existing patent. As it turns out, however, her confidence is misplaced.
The new method, while easy to achieve, is not very successful, and the amount of
resources she spends trying to avoid the patent dwarfs what she would have paid to
license it. Although the market for the rights should have resulted in their efficient
transfer, the scientist’s overconfidence produces an inefficient outcome.163
Now consider how this situation interacts with how initial innovators are likely to
price access to their ideas. As we have demonstrated in previous empirical research,
creators tend to overvalue their creations because they overestimate their quality and
likelihood of market success.164 We call this the “creativity effect.” If the inventor

& Bill Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One Experimental View of
the Cathedral, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138, 159–61 (2011).
160. Maximizing their payoffs in the game is not the only motivation that subjects could
rationally have. They might find one or the other strategy intrinsically more enjoyable, for
example.
161. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
162. KAHNEMAN, supra note 79.
163. Of course, the inverse would be the case for those situations in which borrowing is
very expensive and innovating is the optimal choice.
164. Buccafusco & Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, supra note 68, at 42.
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owning the relevant patent in the above example suffers from a similar phenomenon,
the inventor is likely to charge a higher price for borrowing the patent than
appropriate, because the inventor is overoptimistic about the patent’s quality. This
will further drive a wedge between the lowest amount of money that the inventor is
willing to accept to license the patent and the highest amount of money that the
overoptimistic scientist is willing to pay. If overoptimistic improvers consistently
meet up with overoptimistic initial creators, we would expect to see suboptimal
levels of IP transactions relative to rational choice expectations.
The opposite will be true for underoptimistic improvers like those who borrowed
in the +72 condition of Experiment 1. These subjects demonstrate a high implicit
willingness to pay to borrow. But while this might lead to higher levels of IP
transactions, it will not necessarily lead to optimal levels. Recall that these subjects
are borrowing when there were strong incentives to innovate. In a real world scenario
like the one described above, an insufficiently optimistic scientist would tend to
overpay for the patent license when it could be easily invented around. The excessive
licensing costs would then get passed along to consumers of any resulting
discoveries, thereby increasing product prices and decreasing the number of
consumers who can benefit from the discovery.
As we explained above, the assumption of rationality in rational choice theory
does not entail perfect behavior. Mistakes are inevitable, and, with enough chances,
things could simply balance out. However, there are reasons to be skeptical that
learning strategies and market forces are sufficient to overcome the effects of
heuristics. On a general level, individuals who are subject to behavioral biases are
often unable to overcome these biases even with training. Many behavioral biases
are systematic and robust against learning.165 Just telling an inventor that he may be
too overoptimistic with regard to the prospects of his own invention will not
necessarily reduce his overoptimism. Furthermore, in innovation markets, invented
products and processes are often hard to compare. This impedes the ability of
overoptimistic inventors to imitate and learn from more rational competitors.166
Finally, the market may not be able to compensate for all mistakes and biases creators
make and suffer from.167

165. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes,
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2005, at 43, 54; Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products,
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1253–55 (1994); Rachlinski, supra note
154, at 219–22; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S274–75 (1986).
166. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 749, 756 (2008) (noting that learning and imitation strategies work best in markets in
which products are standardized).
167. In particular, market forces cannot eliminate the impact of behavioral biases if all
market participants are subject to these biases or if sellers cannot determine which buyers are
subject to biases and which are not. In these and other cases, even if only a small number of
market participants are subject to biases or even if these biases are small in size, they can have
significant consequences for competitive equilibria. On this theoretical debate in general, see
Latin, supra note 166, at 1255–57; Schwartz, supra note 154. For specific economic models,
see George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, A Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with
Wage and Price Inertia, 100 Q.J. ECON. 823 (1985) (concerning market participants with
different reaction rates and applying the envelope theorem to aggregated market behavior);
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To the extent that we are correct, this suggests that economic predictions about
the efficiency of innovation markets could be too optimistic. In real-world situations
in which borrowing is optimal, we will tend to see excessive investment in innovation
because downstream creators overestimate how easy it will be to invent around
existing ideas. Conversely, in situations in which innovating is optimal, we will tend
to see excessive borrowing for the opposite reason. Market signals that we would
rely upon to correct poorly-chosen innovation or borrowing may be insufficient to
move people dug in to one strategy or the other—as did even very large bonuses in
our Experiments 1 and 2. Accordingly, innovation markets are unlikely to run
smoothly in the absence of intervention. IP laws may have more to do than
establishing rights and letting the system work its way out.
B. IP Doctrine, Optimism, and Tastes for Innovation
IP law solves market failures by molding people’s behavior. By providing
incentives for some activities and by making other activities more costly, IP doctrines
attempt to affect how people act. But if it is going to accomplish its goal of optimizing
creative production, IP law must accurately assess how people respond to the positive
and negative incentives that it creates. This assessment should not only focus on the
incentives IP law creates to innovate. It should also take into account how IP law
affects incentives to license existing innovations, which we have referred to in this
Article under the term “borrowing.”
As we explained at the beginning of this Article, copyright and patent laws must
balance the incentives of initial creators with those of subsequent creators. They
mostly do this through sequential innovation doctrines like the derivative works right
and the doctrine of equivalents. These doctrines affect the scope of rights that are
given to initial creators and the scope of the innovation space that is preserved for
subsequent creators. By affecting the objective characteristics of the scope of
innovation spaces, IP doctrines attempt to alter the economic values associated with
different courses of conduct and, thus, the conduct that people choose to engage in.

John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The
Implications for Macroeconomics, 104 Q.J. ECON. 463 (1989) (concerning market participants
with different information processing capacities); John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman,
Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 326 (1985) (same); Uri M. Possen & Mikko Puhakka, Some Aggregate Effects of
Heterogeneity in Information Processing, 49 BULL. ECON. RES. 231 (1997) (same); Thomas
Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 1071 (1985) (concerning market participants with different utility functions);
Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive
Markets: Reply, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 499 (1987) (same). For related experimental studies, see
Colin F. Camerer, Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental
Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 981 (1987); Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does
“Economic Man” Dominate Social Behavior?, 311 SCIENCE 47 (2006); Ernst Fehr &
Jean-Robert Tyran, Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 43
(2005); Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The
Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia, 76 ECONOMETRICA 353 (2008).
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Our research suggests that people’s decisions about whether to engage in
innovating or borrowing are not motivated solely by objective factors about
innovation environments. Rather, subjective factors including degrees of optimism
play important roles in people’s choices. In addition, specific features of an
innovation environment can manipulate creators’ behavior when creators rely on
heuristics that are not well-suited to the task. Ultimately, these findings seriously
complicate the law’s ability to channel creators’ conduct. By manipulating the costs
and benefits of innovation behaviors, IP law attempts to encourage people to act in
socially optimal ways. These experiments suggest that the law’s carrots and sticks
may have to be substantially larger than previously realized in order to marginally
influence creators’ behavior.
This insensitivity to incentives may be less of a problem if there will be
opportunities for sorting, such that people with strong preferences either way will
find appropriate creative opportunities consistent with their preferences. This may be
possible, but whether it is depends on the structure of IP doctrines. IP law affects the
extent to which switching between innovating and borrowing is feasible. In
particular, while patent law establishes a relatively level playing field between initial
creators and downstream creators, copyright law strongly favors initial creators in a
way that curtails downstream creators’ ability to borrow. As we described above,168
patent law is generally more solicitous of borrowers than copyright law is. Patent law
allows inventors who make novel and nonobvious contributions to existing
inventions to obtain their own patents without obtaining a license, while copyright
law’s derivative works rule generally prohibits borrowers from engaging in
sequential creativity without first obtaining a license.
If a guitar designer wants to design and craft a guitar in the shape of Prince’s
former unpronounceable (but copyrighted) symbol, he cannot do so unless he obtains
a license beforehand, and he will be subject to a copyright infringement lawsuit if he
makes such a guitar.169 This is because copyright law, as interpreted currently by
most courts, gives control of most tweaking innovations to the original innovator.
This is the result in cases like Pickett v. Prince, in which Judge Posner ruled that a
guitar that the defendant designed based on the unpronounceable symbol that Prince
briefly took as his “name” was an infringement of copyright.170 Judge Posner ruled,
moreover, that the defendant owned no part of his derivative work—even those parts
which were not taken from Prince’s pre-existing work.171 Had the same activity
occurred under the patent regime, however, the designer might have been able to
obtain a patent that he could use to negotiate with Prince. In contrast to patent law,
which creates rights in improvements and assigns them to the improver, copyright
creates no such improver’s rights. All ownership of the right to make derivatives is
concentrated in the pioneer.172 This means that minor innovations are relatively more
expensive in copyright fields than they are in patent fields.

168. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
169. See Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000).
170. Id. at 406.
171. Id. at 407.
172. Judge Posner’s approach in Pickett v. Prince has become the usual rule in copyright.
It is also based on a rather shallow doctrinal mistake. Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act
provides that “protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright
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By making minor innovations more expensive, copyright law, in theory, affects
sequential innovation in ways that patent law does not. First, among more-or-less
rational creators, copyright law encourages them to engage in innovating rather than
borrowing. Because creators are unable to obtain their own rights in their derivate
creations, they will have less incentive to borrow from existing works. As the costs
of borrowing rise, rational people will switch to innovating. Thus, instead of creating
adaptions of existing superheroes, for example, people will create new ones.
Our data suggest that some creators will not respond to this shift in incentives,
because the additional incentives are inframarginal. For creators who are deeply
committed to borrowing, the additional incentive will not be enough to overcome
their aversion to innovating. Our experiments suggest that some creators have strong
individual preferences for borrowing, either due to innovation heuristics or
insufficient optimism about their own creative ability. In addition, they may receive
intrinsic value from tweaking existing ideas that exceeds whatever the market value
of the innovation may produce.173 For example, someone may enjoy manipulating
sound recordings but have no interest in producing new ones. Because copyright law
casts this behavior as infringement (and thus potentially subject to substantial
statutory damages) and because the market value of the new work will often be small,
the would-be borrower will likely forego the exercise entirely.174
While patent law provides downstream creators with options for both innovating
and borrowing, copyright law largely forecloses opportunities for borrowing, at least
without a prior licensing arrangement. In so doing, copyright law further distorts
creators’ behavior in ways that are likely to produce inefficiencies. Although
copyright law may encourage more innovating by discouraging borrowing, this is
not necessarily valuable innovation. In many cases, it will be duplicative and
wasteful. As we have noted, the cumulative value of borrowing may actually be much
greater than that of innovating, but because the value of any individual tweak is
small, borrowing will be especially sensitive to the additional transaction costs that
copyright law’s prelicensing requirement produces.
Whether this variation in the treatment of sequential innovation between patent
and copyright is warranted is a question for IP theory and further empirical research.
As we noted at the outset, the answer depends on one’s assumptions about the costs
and direction of investment in research and the desirability of few or many solutions
to a given problem. On one hand, copyright law’s push toward innovating may
produce greater social welfare if we believe that the kinds of issues that artists face

subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used
unlawfully.” 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). That text straightforwardly implies that copyright
protection can extend to parts of a derivative work that are original to the improver—even if
the parts that are not are used without permission.
173. If some of our borrowers derive considerable intrinsic satisfaction from their
activities, we might hope that this would result in higher willingness to pay to borrow. If that
were the case, then there might be opportunities for licensing these sorts of sequential
creativity. We doubt, however, that the intrinsic pleasure that these creators feel is regularly
translated into economic value in the sense that they are willing to invest considerable sums
in producing it. Moreover, the transaction costs of licensing these sorts of deals are large
relative to the economic value of the individual works that get produced.
174. At best, the would-be borrower might switch to manipulating public domain works.
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are best approached from a variety of different perspectives. Perhaps, by encouraging
artists to innovate, copyright law is pushing them to view problems with fresh eyes
and new insight.175 On the other hand, we might think that when artistic creativity is
involved, people do not value too much novelty, instead preferring reinterpretations
of familiar themes.176 This is in contrast to technological creativity where people
value maximal novelty.177 If this is the case, then copyright law is hindering exactly
the kind of creative expression that people want most.
We are not in a position to justify or refute one of these normative assertions. We
raise them to illustrate the potential practical importance of our findings and their
relevance to IP policy. If copyright law’s emphasis on innovating over borrowing is
socially costly, there is a readily available alternative that is derived from patent law.
The law could reject Judge Posner’s interpretation and allow borrowers to obtain
“blocking copyrights” in their new contributions.178 This would level the playing
field between initial creators and downstream creators and balance out the incentives
that downstream creators face for innovating and borrowing.179
C. Addressing the Limitations of This Research
The laboratory experiments reported here allow us to test fundamental
assumptions about people’s behavior in novel ways. Random assignment of subjects
to different conditions allows us to investigate causal relationships between factors
that are not easily measured in other kinds of empirical studies.180 As always, though,
these advantages come with certain costs. Aspects of our experimental design
produce unavoidable limitations in the strength and generalizability of our findings.
We have discussed many of these at length in a previous paper and will only briefly
mention them here.181

175. For example, it has been suggested that the inability of the filmmakers of Selma, the
biopic about Martin Luther King, Jr., to use his copyrighted speeches encouraged them to think
creatively about the meaning of King’s work rather than just its words. See Jonathan Band,
How Copyright Forced a Filmmaker To Rewrite Martin Luther King's Historic Words,
TECHDIRT (Dec. 30, 2014, 6:13 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141229
/13390429545/how-copyright-forced-filmmaker-to-rewrite-martin-luther-king.shtml [https://perma.cc
/8L5Y-D5AK] (“Proponents of long copyright term might point to these reviews as proof of
the copyright system working properly. Denied the ability to quote King directly, DuVernay
was forced to create her own expression—paraphrases of King's speeches—and her own
interpretation of King's life.”).
176. See Fromer, supra note 72, at 1479.
177. Id. at 1484.
178. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1075–76.
179. We are not committed to this as the optimal strategy. Creating a blocking copyrights
regime would increase transaction costs associated with licensing derivative works. In theory,
at least, this could cause some of the public goods problems that Kitch was concerned with.
See Kitch, supra note 43, at 266.
180. ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW 101 (2010) (“[O]ne of the advantages of the experimental design is in its
ability to isolate causal relationships.”).
181. See Buccafusco et al., supra note 90, at 1973–75.
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A first set of limitations relates to our subject population. We recruited subjects
from AMT rather than using real creators and innovators.182 We did this primarily
for purposes of ease and cost reduction. Running these experiments with similar
numbers of real-life creators would have been enormously more expensive.
Nonetheless, these samples could differ in important ways, including in terms of
intrinsic motivation, skill, and demographic characteristics. Moreover, unlike our
sample of individually acting subjects, many creators work as part of firms.183
Perhaps aspects of firm relations alter the individual effects that we see here. While
we look forward to running similar experiments with more realistic samples in the
future, we also want to note the extent to which creativity and innovation are
increasingly mass phenomena.184
A second set of limitations involves the creativity tasks that we employed.
Although the wagon game involved aspects of creativity associated with algorithmic
and heuristic thinking, it obviously differs in many ways from filming a movie or
designing a smartphone. And while the Scrabble task may be closer to artistic
creativity, it obviously still does not cover the entire creative process of a Picasso
painting. Perhaps our results would have been different if we had used more
open-ended creativity tasks or if the games had involved slower cognition. It is
certainly possible, although it is difficult for us to predict how these changes would
likely affect our results.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps more than any other area of the law, IP is grounded in the idea that legal
doctrines can affect people’s behavior in socially beneficial ways. In order to
succeed, however, the law needs an accurate account of human motivation. The
four experiments reported in this Article shed new light on the central issue of IP
law—how best to regulate sequential innovation. More research like this is
essential if IP law is going to give up its reliance on untested assumptions and
adopt a behaviorally realistic view of human motivation.

182. We discuss debates about the validity and reliability of Mechanical Turk samples
supra note 97.
183. Similarly, creative production frequently occurs in teams, which might also change
the effects or salience of IP thresholds. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki,
Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2013).
184. Consider the rise of Web 2.0. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated
Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459; see also VON HIPPEL, supra note 148 at 1 (“When I say
that innovation is being democratized, I mean that users of products and services—both firms
and individual consumers—are increasingly able to innovate for themselves.”); Stefan
Bechtold, Physicians as User Innovators, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE
CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 343 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014).
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT 1: WAGON BONUS
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. When the coefficient is greater than 1.0,
this indicates a positive relationship between that variable and innovating. When it
is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship. Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no
directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard error.
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow)
p < 0.01 - ***
p < 0.05 - **
p < 0.10 - *
Variable

Reg. 1

Reg. 2

Reg. 3

Reg. 4

Reg. 5

Bonus condition

1.002
(0.004)
—

—

—

—

—

—

0.594***
(0.156)
3.866***
(0.156)
—

0.566***
(0.163)
3.704***
(0.155)
—

1.231
(0.136)
0.751**
(0.127)
0.853
(0.160)
1.262
(0.156)
0.771*
(0.141)
—

1.156
(0.138)
0.853
(0.110)
—

Ease of solving
Ease of innovating

—

Risk seeking

—

Openness

—

0.589***
(0.151)
3.726***
(0.150)
0.972
(0.076)
—

Extroversion

—

—

Conscientiousness

—

—

Agreeableness

—

—

Neuroticism

—

—

Age

—

—

Gender

—

—

Constant
Did not understand
instructions
Observations
R2

1.993***
(0.160)
—
432
0.00067

0.412
(0.564)
—
432
0.237

—
—
1.329**
(0.119)
0.858
(0.108)
0.878
(0.141)
1.130
(0.137)
0.852
(0.122)
1.018*
(0.011)
0.993
(0.224)
0.909
(1.320)
—
432
0.028

—
0.554
(1.477)
—
432
0.254

—
—
1.014
(0.012)
0.992
(0.254)
0.517
(1.110)
0.604**
(0.110)
432
0.253
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT: WAGON SOURCES
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. The default condition is Previous AMT
Player. When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, this indicates a positive relationship
between that variable and innovating. When it is less than 1.0, there is a negative
relationship. Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no directional relationship. Numbers
in parentheses indicate standard error.
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow)
p < 0.01 - ***
p < 0.05 - **
p < 0.10 - *
Variable

Reg. 1

Reg. 2

Reg. 3

Reg. 4

MIT Student

1.542
(0.355)
0.922
(0.340)
—

1.389
(0.400)
0.834
(0.376)
—

1.349
(0.411)
0.837
(0.390)
1.047**
(0.020)
1.636
(0.351)
—

Gender

—

Risk seeking

—

Perceived quality of
solution
Ease of solving

—

1.643
(0.347)
0.938
(0.347)
1.025
(0.017)
1.646
(0.314)
0.963
(0.094)
—

—

—

Ease of innovating

—

—

Did not understand
instructions
Constant

—

—

1.483
(0.240)
212
0.011

0.415
(0.742)
212
0.037

Computer
Generated
Age

Observations
R2

—
—
0.976**
(0.011)
0.481***
(0.202)
2.447***
(0.188)
0.524**
(0.273)
24.856***
(1.208)
212
0.189

0.973**
(0.012)
0.486***
(0.206)
2.651***
(0.197)
0.471***
(0.283)
3.810
(1.425)
212
0.225
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 2: SCRABBLE BONUS
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. When the coefficient is greater than 1.0,
this indicates a positive relationship between that variable and innovating. When it
is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship. Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no
directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard error.
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow)
p < 0.01 - ***
p < 0.05 - **
p < 0.10 - *
Variable
Bonus variable
Ease of solving
Ease of innovating
Openness

Reg. 1
1.012***
(0.004)
0.504***
(0.138)
3.910***
(0.135)
—

Extraversion

—

Conscientiousness

—

Agreeableness

—

Neuroticism

—

Age
Education
Gender
Risk seeking
Confidence in
verbal/language ability
How often do you play
Scrabble
Motivation to score
well
How well did you
understand instructions
Constant
Observations
R2

0.991
(0.011)
1.020
(0.077)
0.851
(0.217)
1.056
(0.075)
1.037
(0.147)
1.109
(0.099)
0.926
(0.161)
1.261
(0.243)
0.144**
(0.964)
541
0.293

Reg. 2

Reg. 3

Reg. 4

Reg. 5

—

1.013***
(0.004)
0.508***
(0.138)
3.903***
(0.135)
0.996
(0.012)
1.000
(0.011)
0.998
(0.012)
1.016
(0.015)
0.993
(0.011)
0.989
(0.011)
1.025
(0.078)
0.840
(0.227)
1.052
(0.082)
1.029
(0.151)
1.114
(0.099)
0.894
(0.166)
1.323
(0.250)
0.124
(1.605)
541
0.296

1.013***
(0.004)
0.519***
(0.135)
3.882***
(0.133)
0.997
(0.012)
1.000
(0.010)
0.997
(0.012)
1.014
(0.014)
0.996
(0.010)
—

1.012***
(0.004)
0.515***
(0.135)
3.889***
(0.133)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—
—
1.002
(0.010)
1.009
(0.008)
1.004
(0.010)
1.015
(0.012)
1.003
(0.009)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.177*
(0.969)
541
0.008

0.138
(1.236)
541
0.290

—
—
—
—
—

0.194***
(0.387)
541
0.288
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENT 3: WAGON QUALITY
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. The default condition is 60% Strength.
When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, this indicates a positive relationship between
that variable and innovating. When it is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship.
Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses
indicate standard error.
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow)
p < 0.01 - ***
p < 0.05 - **
p < 0.10 - *
Variable

Reg. 1

Reg. 2

Reg. 3

Reg. 4

80% condition

0.574
(0.376)
0.396***
(0.356)
—

0.608
(0.379)
0.399**
(0.360)
0.999
(0.014)
0.643
(0.304)
1.015
(0.093)
—

0.484*
(0.412)
0.581
(0.398)
—

0.516
(0.416)
0.600
(0.399)
—

—

0.735
(0.330)
—

100% condition
Age
Gender

—

Risk preference

—

Ease of solving

—

Ease of innovating

—

Constant
Observations
R2

3.937***
(0.280)
241
0.029

—
4.842**
(0.747)
241
0.040

—
0.528***
(0.210)
2.826***
(0.182)
1.793
(0.632)
241
0.192

0.534***
(0.212)
2.801***
(0.182)
2.064
(0.651)
241
0.195
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APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENT 4: SCRABBLE QUALITY
Logistic regression of innovation behavior. The default condition is 60% Strength.
When the coefficient is greater than 1.0, this indicates a positive relationship between
that variable and innovating. When it is less than 1.0, there is a negative relationship.
Coefficients equal to 1.0 indicate no directional relationship. Numbers in parentheses
indicate standard error.
Dependent Variable – Innovation/Borrow Dummy (1 = Innovate; 0 = Borrow)
p < 0.01 - ***, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.10 - *
Variable
80% group
100% group
Ease of solving
Ease of innovating
Openness

Reg. 1

Reg. 2

Reg. 3

Reg. 4

Reg. 5

0.961
(0.355)
3.957***
(0.421)
0.711*
(0.167)
2.784***
(0.167)
—

—

—

—

—

4.158***
(0.380)
0.715**
(0.170)
2.790***
(0.165)
—

0.982
(0.344)
4.000***
(0.410)
0.693**
(0.168)
2.756***
(0.164)
—

—

—

3.858***
(0.377)
0.683**
(0.312)
2.751***
(0.164)
1.025
(0.015)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1.014
(0.014)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.608
(0.332)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.888
(0.142)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Extraversion

—

Conscientiousness

—

Agreeableness

—

Neuroticism

—

Age
Education
Gender
Risk Seeking
Confidence in
verbal/language ability
How often do you play
Scrabble
Motivation to score well
How well did you
understand instructions
Constant
Observations
R2

1.013
(0.014)
1.060
(0.119)
0.574
(0.347)
0.935
(0.106)
1.052
(0.226)
0.865
(0.147)
1.121
(0.244)
1.100
(0.339)
0.147
(1.424)
273
0.333

—
—
1.027**
(0.013)
1.003
(0.012)
0.993
(0.017)
1.021
(0.017)
1.000
(0.013)
—
—
—

0.132
(1.429)
273
0.033

0.232*
(0.816)
273
0.331

—

0.306**
(0.547)
273
0.326

0.623
(0.169)
—

0.082
(0.979)
273
0.332
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APPENDIX F: AN EXPERIMENT 1 FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT
One possibility is that the results of our first experiment are merely an artifact
of the experimental design based on the subject’s perception of the source of the
provided submission on which the subject is attempting to improve. In the real
world, follow-on innovators receive more information about existing ideas than in
our first experiment. They may know, for example, whether the original innovator
was a very talented and bright individual. In such case, follow-on innovators may
consider it harder to “invent around” an existing idea and therefore decide to
borrow rather than innovate. We ran another experiment to test whether subjects’
decisions to innovate or borrow are influenced by the perceived quality of the
original innovator.
We used the same wagon-creativity task and experimental software program as
the previous experiment. After going through the practice game, subjects were
given the same instructions about the nature of the game and the distribution of
points as in Experiment 1. Subjects were also told that they would receive an
additional sixteen points if their submission did not use three or more of the items
from the existing submission. In three conditions to which subjects were randomly
assigned, subjects were given different information about who had created the
existing submission. In the baseline condition, subjects were told that the existing
submission was randomly generated by a computer. In the second condition,
subjects were informed that the submission was entered by a participant in a
previous version of this study run on AMT. In the third condition, subjects were
told that the submission was entered by a participant in a previous version of this
study that was run at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). For each
condition, the provided submission was the same one that had been used in
Experiment 1. Subjects then played the game, replied to comprehension questions,
and answered a series of follow-up and demographic questions similar to those
used in the previous experiment.
We recruited 303 subjects via AMT to participate in this follow-up
experiment. As in Experiment 1, subjects were paid $0.50 for participating and
$0.03 for each point they scored in the game. We excluded 73 subjects from the
final data analysis for missing one or both of the comprehension questions or for
missing an attention question. We also removed 18 subjects who went over the
weight limit. This left us with 212 subjects. They remained equally distributed
across the three conditions, had a mean age of 30.75, and 62.74% of them were
male.
Our results do not confirm expectations that a higher perceived quality of the
original innovator should prompt subjects to innovate less and borrow more. A
superficial look at the descriptive data seems to suggest otherwise: the percentage
of subjects choosing to innovate increases rather than decreases when moving from
a computer-generated original submission, to a submission generated by another
subject, to a submission created by an MIT student. However, a comparison of the
three samples reveals that they cannot be said to be statistically different with a
sufficient level of confidence.

2016]

INNOVATION HEURISTICS

1307

Table 10. Percentage innovating per condition

Percentage (%)
innovating

Computer-generated
condition

Other AMT subject
condition

MIT student
condition

57.75
(a)(b)

59.72
(a)(c)

69.57
(b)(c)

(a) Computer-generated versus other subject: two-tail t-test, p = 0.81.
(b) Computer-generated versus MIT student: two-tail t-test, p = 0.15.
(c) Other subject versus MIT student: two-tail t-test, p = 0.22.

Again, subjects’ answers to follow-up questions reveal that the strongest predictor
of their behavior was their perception of how easy it would be to innovate. The easier
they thought it would be to innovate, the more likely they were to do so. See supra
Appendix B, Regression 4. In addition, as subjects’ perception of the given solution’s
increased, they increasingly decided to borrow. See supra Appendix B, Regression
4. This conforms to rational expectations, as well, because the better they believe the
given solution to be, the harder it will be to innovate.
Finally, despite the very different identities of those who supposedly provided the
solutions, our subjects did not differ in how strong they thought the given solution
was between conditions. Whether they were told that the solution was randomly
generated or submitted by an MIT student, subjects thought the solution was about
the same quality. (The mean [standard deviation] of subjects’ perceived quality of
the solution were as follows: Previous Participant: 72.28 [16.93]; MIT Student: 75.96
[15.28]; Computer Generated: 75.92 [16.35]. Interestingly, these estimates are lower
than the actual quality of the solution [90%], which could explain why subjects chose
to innovate at such high rates. All differences are nonsignificant.)

